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The Ethosophy of the Grizzly Man: Timothy Treadwell’s Three Ethologies
This paper explores the ethical appropriateness and significance of Timothy Treadwell’s life
among the bears and foxes of Alaska’s Katmai National Park and Preserve. In an attempt to
reveal the formative and transformative aspects of Treadwell’s project, I rely upon an ethological
framework developed by Matthew Calarco that moves beyond the narrow conception of ethology
as a scientific practice aimed at systematic and rigorous documentation of the quantifiable
aspects of animal behavior. While many people might be hesitant to conceive of Treadwell’s
project as an ethological one, I hope to illuminate the ways in which his life among bears and
foxes might be understood as emblematic of a kind of amateur ethology and ethological
philosophy (i.e., ethosophy) and then use this understanding of Treadwell’s work to give shape to
the disclosive, generative, and transformative aspects of such practice. I then suggest that
ethological experiments of this sort, while subjecting practitioners to certain risks, are vitally
important for understanding human-animal relationships, reducing conflict between humans and
other predator species, and generating systemic cultural changes in view of other animals.
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The Ethosophy of the Grizzly Man:
Timothy Treadwell’s Three Ethologies

I. Introduction
In an attempt to reveal the formative and transformative aspects of Timothy Treadwell’s
project, I rely upon an ethological framework developed by Matthew Calarco that moves beyond
the narrow conception of ethology as a scientific practice aimed at systematic and rigorous
documentation of the quantifiable aspects of animal behavior. While many people might be
hesitant to conceive of Treadwell’s project as an ethological one, I hope to illuminate the ways in
which his life among bears and foxes might be understood as emblematic of a kind of amateur
ethology and ethological philosophy (i.e., ethosophy) and then use this understanding of
Treadwell’s work to give shape to the disclosive, generative, and transformative aspects of such
practice. I then suggest that ethological experiments of this sort, while subjecting practitioners to
certain risks, are vitally important for understanding human-animal relationships, reducing
conflict between humans and other predator species, and generating systemic cultural changes in
view of other animals.
II. Rethinking Ethological Practice: Calarco’s Three Ethologies
Rather than limiting our understanding of ethology strictly to the scientific study of
animal behavior, Matthew Calarco suggests that we think of ethology as a manner of doing
philosophy—that is, an ethosophy—that engages with the question of how we might generate
new possibilities for human-animal relationships in ways that exceed what is currently possible
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given the legal, socio-political, and infrastructural limitations imposed by the dominant culture. 1
Following Félix Guattari’s work in The Three Ecologies, Calarco suggests that we understand
and practice ethology along three distinct registers; namely, the social, the environmental, and
the mental.2 For Calarco, these dimensions of ethology emerge from both the rich etymology of
ethology (from the Greek, ἠθολογία [ethology] and its root, ἦθος [ethos]), as well as from
ethological practice itself (more specifically, from the practice of living with and studying morethan-human animals on their terms; that is, from the practice of “interviewing an animal in its
own language”).3
In order to bring the philosophical force and transformative potential of each of these
ethological registers into view, Calarco calls upon the work of Joe Hutto, an ethologist and writer
who spent seven years living with a pack of wild mule deer in Deadman’s Gulch, Wyoming. 4
Calarco decided to use Hutto’s work to illuminate the transformative aspects of ethology because
“it is representative of the kind of contemporary ethology that seeks to do justice to the richness
and complexity of animal life, and because of the unique findings that derive from [Hutto’s]
sustained, deep ethological approach.”5 While Hutto’s project is distinct from Treadwell’s in a
number of fashions, Calarco’s reading of Hutto is extremely useful for understanding what was
and is at stake in Treadwell’s project. I hope to use these three registers of ethological practice—

1
Matthew Calarco. “The Three Ethologies.” In Exploring Animal Encounters: Philosophical, Cultural,
and Historical Perspectives, edited by Dominik Ohrem and Matthew Calarco, 48-66. Palgrave Macmillan,
Forthcoming.
2

Félix Guattari. "The Three Ecologies (trans. Ian Pindar and Paul Sutton)." London: Athlone 69 (2000).
See Robert Sapolsky. “9. Ethology”. Filmed [April 2010]. YouTube video, 1:41:06. Posted [February
2011]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ISVaoLlW104. The neuroendocrinologist and ethologist, Robert
Sapolsky defines ethology as “interviewing an animal in its language” during his YouTube lecture series on human
behavioral biology through Stanford University.
4
For more on Hutto’s mule deer project see, Joe Hutto. Touching the Wild: Living with the Mule Deer of
Deadman Gulch. Skyhorse Publishing, Inc., 2016. Joe Hutto is also known for several other professional ethological
projects including one in which he lived with wild turkeys for two years. For more on Hutto’s life with turkeys see
Joe Hutto. Illumination in the Flatwoods. Lyons & Burford, 1995.
5
Calarco, forthcoming, p. 49.
3
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understood as both a manner of doing philosophy in view of animals and as material engagement
with other animals on their terms—to characterize Treadwell’s life among bears and foxes as an
exposed (e.g., posed outward, vulnerable, unconcealed) and experimental (e.g., exploratory,
unpredictable, open-ended) ethological project. I would also like to use these registers to give
shape to the social, environmental, and mental transformations that Treadwell experienced
through his encounters and relationships with other animals as well as the transformations that
these more-than-human participants underwent through their experimental engagement with
Treadwell. Following Calarco, I hope to use these registers to illuminate and appreciate “the
promises and challenges associated with those transformations by articulating them in terms of
social, environmental, and mental ethologies.” 6
III. Treadwell’s Social Ethology
For Calarco, social ethology “is aimed at a careful study and consideration of what
constitutes social life among animals as well as between human beings and animals.” 7 This form
of ethology encourages us to think critically about the composition and character of social
relations and invites us to consider how these social formations might be reconstituted, reshaped,
and transformed along new and different lines. This aspect of ethology takes on significance in
light of how harmful and exclusionary many contemporary social arrangements are with respect
to the majority of animal species (including sub-groups of humans who have been devalued and
subjected to various forms of animalization). Social ethology, as a practice, highlights how these
social arrangements might be transformed to produce more just, pluralistic, and inclusive forms
of social relation.

6
7

Calarco, forthcoming, p. 50.
Calarco, forthcoming, p. 49.
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In light of the focus on exploring and engaging in alternative social relations, Calarco
encourages us to consider this sort of ethology as inherently and necessarily experimental. This
experimentality has two primary aspects. First, since ethological research often involves living
with other animals on their terms, practitioners are exposed to unfamiliar and oftentimes uncanny
modes of relation and ways of being-in-the-world; we might think of this as the disclosive
component of experimental social ethology. 8 Secondly, however, through the practice of social
ethology, one participates in the generation of unanticipatable and unprecedented social
relations, exchanges, and interactions that emerge and unfold in ways that affect all parties
involved; we might think of this as the generative component of experimental social ethology. 9
As an experimental practice that discloses pre-existing social configurations and generates
unique social becomings and assemblages, Calarco suggests that we recognize how ethology
provides us with glimpses of other forms of life. 10 These glimpses expose us to the possibility of

8
For more on Heidegger’s being-in-the-world see Martin Heidegger. The fundamental concepts of
metaphysics: World, finitude, solitude. Indiana University Press, 1995. Heidegger’s understanding of being-in-theworld excludes animals, however. For a sample of accounts that challenge the exclusivity and anthropocentrism of
Heidegger’s notion of being-in-the-world, see Jacques Derrida. Of spirit: Heidegger and the question. University of
Chicago Press, 1991.; Giorgio Agamben. The open: Man and animal. Stanford university press, 2004.; Cary Wolfe
ed. Zoontologies: the question of the animal. U of Minnesota Press, 2003.; Matthew Calarco. Zoographies: The
question of the animal from Heidegger to Derrida. Columbia University Press, 2008.; and Simone Gustafsson.
Outside of Being': Animal Being in Agamben's Reading of Heidegger. 2013.
9
It is important to note, however, that the distinction between disclosure and generation is not always clear.
There are disclosive aspects of generating new social configurations, for instance, because possibilities are revealed
through such practice. This distinction, however, highlights the difference between recognizing extant relations and
producing new ones.
10
For more on these sorts of social becomings see, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. A thousand plateaus:
Capitalism and schizophrenia. Bloomsbury Publishing, 1988.; Donna J. Haraway. When species meet. Vol. 224. U
of Minnesota Press, 2008.; and Eduardo Kohn. "How dogs dream: Amazonian natures and the politics of
transspecies engagement." American ethnologist 34, no. 1 (2007): 3-24. For a helpful summary of Deleuze’s use of
becoming, assemblage, and affect see, Daniel Smith and John Protevi. "Gilles Deleuze", The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/deleuze/>. Here, they say, “In the most general terms Deleuze
develops throughout his career, puissance is the ability to affect and to be affected, to form assemblages or
consistencies, that is, to form emergent unities that nonetheless respect the heterogeneity of their components. (Here
we see the empiricist theme of the “externality of relations”: in an assemblage or consistency, the “becoming” or
relation of the terms attains its own independent ontological status. In Deleuze’s favorite example, the wasp and
orchid create a “becoming” or symbiotic emergent unit.)” When commenting on dog-human becomings, Kohn says

Ginsburg 5

living otherwise with other animals—in ways that might not be currently available or
actualizable given the various constraints imposed by the all-too-human institutions and
practices of the dominant culture. For Calarco, the experimental aspects of such engagement
might encourage us to think of ethological practice “not simply as a tool for expanding a given
social order but as a means for fundamentally rethinking how the socius is constituted as such.”11
While the dominant culture tends to present the socius as fixed and permanent, Calarco
suggests that we think of the socius “as inherently open-ended—as something that emerges in
and through experimentation with new relations that undo old configurations and open up
additional potentials.”12 Rather than hypostatizing existing relations as fixed or endorsing the
belief that any social arrangement is possible, social ethology encourages us to explore and
engage with the material constraints that delimit and shape social possibilities as well. This
engagement with materiality avoids the criticism that social ethology might be committed to the
idealistic (or immaterial and unrealistic) belief that any social arrangement is possible or
actualizable. As such, social ethology is best understood as a practice that provides deep insight
into the possibility spaces that exist for social arrangements between different sorts of entities.
Moreover, as a practice, social ethology requires engagement with the question of how we might
work within and through extant material conditions to actualize such potentials.
It is important to note, however, that regardless of the material conditions that are present
in any particular social arrangement, the “inherent open-endedness” of the socius remains. By
this, I mean to say that the socius is constantly shaped and reshaped through engagement and can
that “[s]uch becomings change what it means to be alive; they change what it means to be human just as much as
they change what it means to be a dog or even a predator.”
11
Calarco, forthcoming, pp. 50-51. Calarco “use[s] the term socius here in a capacious sense to refer to the
broad sets of relations and affective ties that include but go well beyond “society” and “community” as those terms
are normally understood.”
12
Calarco, forthcoming, p. 51.
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always become other-than-it-is. Ethological practice that takes seriously the open-endedness of
the socius then reveals an alternative social ontology that stands in stark contrast to many
idealized, immaterial, and unrealistic conceptions of social arrangements and possibilities.13 A
social ontology such as this embraces the descriptive project of documenting and characterizing
extant social relations, while simultaneously illuminating the experimental, creative, and
affirmative project of unveiling and actualizing alternative social possibilities.
Hutto’s approach to ethology, in Calarco’s view, might be understood as emblematic of
the “open-ended and experimental attitude [that] is essential for ethological practice.” 14 For
example, Calarco emphasizes that Hutto refused to subscribe to any belief in the impropriety of
human-deer relationships. Instead, he “willingly enters into the world of the deer in order to form
different social assemblages and to experiment with other ways of seeing and living.” 15 This is
an attitude that Treadwell and Hutto share. Treadwell’s decision to live with bears and foxes
required him to abandon the life and world that he was most familiar with in favor of an
experimental engagement with new and different ways of life with new and different individuals
and social assemblages.16
It may be unsurprising that criticisms of this experimental and adventurous attitude are
central to many attacks on Treadwell. While some believe that humans either cannot or should

13
That is, by disclosing and generating alternative social arrangements, ethological projects performatively
demonstrate that socii are not immutable and challenge the notion that is it impossible to generate interspecies social
assemblages. As such, any social ontology that assumes socii are immutable and fixed becomes untenable, which
reveals the necessity of adopting an alternative social ontology to make sense of the fluidity and negotiability of
socii. For more on alternative social ontologies of this kind see, Manuel DeLanda. A new philosophy of society:
Assemblage theory and social complexity. A&C Black, 2006.; and Manuel DeLanda. "Deleuzian social ontology and
assemblage theory." Deleuze and the Social (2006): 250-266.
14
Calarco, forthcoming, p. 52.
15
Calarco, forthcoming, p. 52.
16
Following Manuel Delanda, I think of individuals and collectives as assemblages themselves and not as
different ontological kinds. I use the term individual here to capture the distinction between singular nonhuman
animal individuals and larger assemblages comprised of nonhuman animal individuals (e.g., social groupings,
populations, communities, etc.).
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not develop social bonds with “wild” animals in general, others simply believe that humans
cannot or should not develop social bonds with “dangerous” animals or relatively solitary
nonhuman predators. Interestingly, however, despite Hutto’s similar experimental attitude, he
tends not to be criticized on the same grounds as Treadwell, either because critics are more open
to the idea of humans developing social bonds with herbivorous herd animals such as mule deer,
or perhaps, because Hutto’s more conservative methodology and amicable attitude make his
project more digestible to potential critics.17 Calarco is quick to point out, however, that “while
the socius [Hutto] forms with this specific pack of mule deer would likely not be replicated with,
say, a predator species, this does not entail that sociality is somehow less plastic in these other
contexts.”18 Since we cannot write off Treadwell’s project on the grounds that predator species
are inherently less socially plastic, we should be sympathetic to the experimental attitude that
animates Treadwell’s decision to live with predatory bears and foxes. 19
Social Plasticity
According to Calarco, Hutto was frequently surprised by the social plasticity and
relational possibilities that were revealed and enacted throughout his time living with mule deer.
The social dynamics between him and individual mule deer unfolded through time and
transformed dramatically. Over the course of many months and years, Hutto eventually gained

17

The issue of Treadwell’s indigestibility requires more space to explore than I have available here. It is
important to note, however, that many critiques of Treadwell circulate around his mental health, sexuality, gender
presentation, and so on. For examples see Werner Herzog. "Grizzly Man (film)." Santa Monica, CA: Lions Gate
Film (2005).; and Michael Lapinski. Death in the Grizzly Maze: The Timothy Treadwell Story. Guilford: Falcon,
2005.These criticisms are not leveled at Hutto, who is a soft-spoken, masculine-presenting, heterosexual married
man, with mild manners. While they share similar attitudes toward ethological practice, Treadwell is frequently
dismissed for superficial reasons that fail to attend to the spirit of his ethological project.
18
Calarco, forthcoming, p. 53.
19
Treadwell and Palovak, 1999, p. 102. It is worth mentioning here that, in a perhaps counter-intuitive
fashion, Treadwell considered the red foxes to be more violent predators that the brown bears of Katmai, since they
relied almost exclusively on killing prey in order to survive.
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acceptance from the pack, while the pack continued to treat other humans with suspicion and
denied them the same access they granted to Hutto.
Like Hutto, Treadwell was constantly surprised by the social plasticity of both bears and
foxes. While bears and foxes are relatively solitary animals that tend not to be understood as
having robust intraspecific social networks like many herd animals (such as mule deer, for
example), Treadwell repeatedly commented on how surprised he was to learn that many
individuals did not avoid his presence and some even sought him out. This is especially true with
respect to the foxes of Katmai, particularly “Timmy the Fox,” who would follow Treadwell
around and seemed to enjoy his company. 20
In Among Grizzlies: Living with Wild Bears in Alaska, Treadwell notes that these sorts of
possibilities might have been made possible by the material ecological conditions of the region,
which afforded a surplus of resources and encouraged bears and foxes to congregate in ways that
are not typical for inland populations. The excess of resources such as fish, clams, and sedge
grass encouraged high concentrations of bears and increased degrees of sociability due to
relatively low resource competition.21 Treadwell was well aware that this socio-ecological
context decreased the likelihood that he would be subjected to violent predatory behaviors or
treated as a competitor, which helped foster the sort of tolerance and acceptance that he was
hoping to achieve through his interactions with these animals. 22 This recognition reveals

20

Treadwell and Palovak, 1999, pp. 45, 96; Herzog, 2005. In the film Grizzly Man, Spirit, the fox, and her
kits willingly approach Treadwell in an open field. This theme will be returned to in the section on mental ethology.
21
Treadwell and Palovak, 1999, p. 120. As Treadwell notes, this is especially true during heavy salmon
runs; “Years of studying bears had taught me that during major salmon runs, brown grizzlies were more tolerant of
other life because of the abundance of food.”
22
Treadwell and Palovak, 1999, p. 138; “There are other clues to my acceptance by bears in the habitat and
social conditions of the bears I live among. These animals are coastal brown bears, historically more tolerant than
other types of bears. These bears migrate in large numbers to areas with abundant food sources. Competition
between grizzles for food in a finite area forces the bears to develop their social skills. A recognized social hierarchy
and tolerance among grizzlies reduces the levels of aggression to a minimum.”
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Treadwell’s engagement with the material substrate and context within which his project was
made possible. He understood that the environment afforded unique bear-human and fox-human
social possibilities.
Treadwell also revealed the unrecognized social plasticity and sociability of bears
through stories and footage of him interacting with individual bears in surprisingly intimate
fashions. For example, in the film Grizzly Man, Treadwell is frequently seen within touching
distance of cubs and wading through the water alongside an adult brown bear. 23 Treadwell also
details the manner in which bears would use his presence to deter other bears from harassing or
assaulting them and mentions that he used a similar social tactic to deter certain aggressive bears
from charging him, by keeping a bear who trusted him between himself and hostile individuals. 24
These interactions fostered new and unprecedented social dynamics that challenged prevailing
conceptions of these animals as socially static entities.
It is also important to note that Treadwell’s relationships with the bears and foxes
respectively, may have played a role in reconstituting the social dynamics between bears and
foxes themselves. While I will not take up the details of how this may have happened here, it is
worth noting that in many instances during Treadwell’s footage, the bears and foxes are in
relatively close proximity to one another. In his book, Treadwell reveals the capacity for
unanticipated and unprecedented bear-fox social possibilities when he describes his astonishment
upon discovering Timmy the Fox sleeping with three bear cubs;
. . . I noticed something odd in the mass of brown and gold fur. In the pile of dozing cubs
was a strange little orange blob. I squinted in disbelief. Passed out in the middle of the
babies was that darn little fox. ‘Psst, Timmy!’ I whispered. ‘What are you doing, little
buddy? In case you’ve forgotten, you’re a red fox, not a grizzly bear.’ Timmy responded
with a groggy yawn, then stretched his paw across Scruffy’s back and nodded off. 25
23

Herzog, 2005; Treadwell is also seen interacting and playing with foxes in surprisingly intimate fashions.
Treadwell and Palovak, 1999, pp. 32, 90.
25
Treadwell and Palovak, 1999, pp. 46-47.
24
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While this account is anecdotal, it seems to reveal an important aspect of Treadwell’s
project. The lack of fear exhibited by the foxes and the corresponding lack of suspicion on the
part of bears, may have been generated, or at least encouraged, by Treadwell’s ability to gain the
trust of individual bears and foxes. More specifically, it seems possible that the trust that these
animals exhibited toward Treadwell may have facilitated interspecies interactions between
members of these species. Although the lack of fear on the part of certain foxes may have also
stemmed from the infrequency of bear-fox predation (since grizzly and brown bears are not
known to routinely eat red foxes), it is interesting to consider the possibility that the red foxes’
trust and perhaps affection for Treadwell may have encouraged them to risk being in closer
proximity to bears than they would absent his presence. 26 While this question is largely empirical
and the point speculative, if Treadwell did encourage these animals to live in closer proximity
than they did prior to his arrival, then we might understand him as an interspecies liaison or
bonding catalyst of sorts.
Following this line of thought, Treadwell might also be understood as a literal and
figurative world traveller, who moved between the social worlds of various groups of humans,
bears, and foxes, and did so fluidly after years of building social relations with members of each
species.27 From this perspective, Treadwell’s project can be understood as one that
simultaneously revealed and generated new sorts of multispecies becomings, communities, and

26
Treadwell and Palovak, 1999, p. 184. Treadwell does acknowledge, however, that once Timmy had fox
kits of his own, “they did not tend to venture out among the bears” when fishing near them. Treadwell notes that
Kathleen, the mother of Timmy’s kits, was the one who would “bark and yip” to keep the foxes from wandering too
far away.
27
For more on world-travelling see; Maria Lugones. "Playfulness, “world”‐travelling, and loving
perception." Hypatia 2, no. 2 (1987): 3-19.; and AnaLouise Keating. "New Mestiza, Nepantlera, Beloved Comadre:
Remembering Gloria E. Anzaldúa." Letras Femeninas (2005): 13-20.; this notion will be taken up in more detail
below.
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ecological assemblages, which is something that is often overlooked or negatively valued by
many critics of Treadwell’s project. 28 As such, Treadwell’s ethological project should be
understood as an experiment with and through social indistinction; whereby social boundaries
thought to necessarily separate humans from other animals and other animals from each other
were blurred, transformed, and shown to be deeply contingent and context-dependent. 29
Social attentiveness and Intergenerational Change
Calarco also emphasizes the fact that the social bonds between Hutto and the mule deer
(as a pack and as individuals) required long-term, daily attention and care in order to be
maintained. This is another common thread that runs through the projects of both Hutto and
Treadwell; both were willing to put in years of arduous work to gain measures of familiarity,
tolerability (or indifference), and (in some cases), acceptability with other animals. While the
social bonds built between Hutto and the mule deer, on the one hand, and between Treadwell and
the bears (and foxes), on the other, differed in multiple fashions based on the personalities of
individuals and the types of social assemblages already in place when they arrived, they both
gained unprecedented access to various individuals and collective ways of life throughout their
time living with other animals. Both Hutto and Treadwell, for instance, talk about the
intergenerational changes that stemmed from building relationships with particular individuals
and their progeny.
In his book, Hutto describes the intense honor and privilege of being licked by deer with
whom he developed deep and intense relationships, and also details the humbling and

28

For criticisms of this kind, see Lapinski, 2005. These multispecies becomings, communities, and
assemblages are often negatively valued by ecologists and others who subscribe to an outmoded belief in a dualistic
relationship between human and nature.
29
For more on the implications of indistinction in general and social indistinction in particular, see
Matthew Calarco. Thinking through animals: identity, difference, indistinction. Stanford University Press, 2015.
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breathtaking experience of being led by a mother doe to where she recently hid her newly born
and vulnerable fawn.30 Hutto explains that his relationship with this fawn and her children led to
deeper relationships and increased trust.31 As a greater number of deer in the population were
exposed to Hutto from birth, his presence became more and more accepted and familiar, which
allowed for more robust, rich, and intimate interspecific relations to unfold.
Similarly, during Treadwell’s time in Katmai, he came to know and become intimately
close with several multi-generational bear and fox families. The first generation of bears and
foxes, unsurprisingly, were the most skeptical and wary of Treadwell’s presence. However, as he
continued to interact with these animals on a regular basis and earned their trust, they began to
tolerate his presence and treat him in manners ranging from indifference to acceptance. 32 As the
first generation gave birth to the next, however, Treadwell’s presence began to be taken for
granted by an increasing percentage of the bear population. Treadwell’s intergenerational track
record as an unthreatening and friendly creature inspired the individuals with whom he spent the
most time to treat him with increased familiarity, tolerance, and curiosity.
While the new generation’s willingness to engage with Treadwell in more intimate
fashions sometimes placed Treadwell in precarious positions (especially with mothers of curious
bear cubs or with adolescent bears who would “bluff charge” him), it also undercut the
prevalence of fear and distrust within the socius, which characterized many of his most
30

Hutto, 2016, pp. 44, 85. Licking is a social practice mule deer reserve for close family members.
Hutto, 2016, p. 85.
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Contrary to what many of his critics suggest, Treadwell was deeply cognizant of the indifferent attitude
many animals had toward him and recognized that the love he felt for them was an unrequited love in many if not all
cases. While he refers to particular animals who tolerated him or seemed to enjoy his company as friends, his
engagement with these topics suggest that he was deeply aware and accepting of the fact that these animals would
not reciprocate his love. For instance, he notes that when attempting to live with bears in habitats with which he was
unfamiliar, “the risk of rejection was real.” (p. 55). For an account of how Treadwell had a mistaken understanding
of these animals’ abilities to reciprocate, see June Dwyer. "A Non-companion Species Manifesto: Humans, Wild
Animals, and ‘The Pain of Anthropomorphism’." South Atlantic Review 72, no. 3 (2007): 73-89. For examples of
the tendency of bears to ignore Treadwell and his acceptance of this indifference, see Among Grizzlies, pp. 79, 111,
121, 128, 145, and 174.
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uncomfortable engagements when he first embarked on his project. For example, in his book,
Treadwell describes how the relationship that emerged between himself and a mother bear he
named Booble, yielded unanticipated and unprecedented behavioral changes. When Booble’s
cubs were young, Treadwell discouraged them from approaching him despite their curiosity; “He
was especially interested in me, stretching and straining to catch a look, occasionally wandering
close. I cautioned him to stay near his mom, but he ignored me. Booble usually reined him back
in with a series of soft, firm huffs.” 33 But, over time, Booble began to trust Treadwell around her
cubs;
I backed away to give them some space, but distance didn’t’ seem to be what Booble
wanted. She moved her family toward me, shadowing my every step. . . They were so
close that I could hear their breathing. . . I pinched myself in disbelief, elated by their
trust.”34
This unprecedented level of trust eventually led to significant behavioral changes within
Booble that produced a new sort of social assemblage between Treadwell and her family;
“Booble began to let the cubs move closer to me than they were to her, a behavior that testified
to the special bond I shared with this beautiful animal.”35 Experiences like this led Treadwell to
proclaim that “in the Grizzly Sanctuary . . . the mothers [were] the safest bears for [him] to be
around.”36 He said that the tolerance, trust, and friendliness exhibited toward him by these
mothers likely stemmed from the fact that he knew many of them from the time they were cubs
and that they never perceived his presence to be threatening. 37 Rather than belittling the potential
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threat of these mothers (let alone any bear), Treadwell “knew that mothers with cubs could still
be incredibly dangerous, and [he] never approached family groups, always letting them dictate
the distance.”38 Throughout his book and his video footage, Treadwell regularly demonstrates a
keen level of attentiveness to the social etiquettes and a general level of respect for the autonomy
of other bears in dictating the level of intimacy of their interspecific engagements.
Over the years that Treadwell spent in Katmai, an increasing number of individual bears
demonstrated a sense of composure when in his presence, which led to an increased frequency of
nonviolent and oftentimes friendly interactions with these animals. This is not to say that conflict
disappeared—clearly Treadwell and Amie Huguenard’s eventual deaths are evidence of the
contrary—but, it is important to recognize that the character of both the bear and fox social
assemblages in which Treadwell participated transformed overtime as he and these animals
gained familiarity with one another.
These transformations are worth attending to and appreciating, because they reveal
precisely what was at stake for Treadwell in attempting to live alongside bears and foxes on their
terms. Treadwell recognized that conflict and negotiation are aspects of any social relation
regardless of whether the participants are human or more-than-human. Unlike most humananimal relationships, however, where human participants are insulated from harm through
various means (e.g., through the use of cages, walls, and weapons, or through the exclusion of
animals from “human-dominated” spaces etc.), Treadwell was willing to embrace the
inevitability of such conflict and negotiations while forsaking his own means of establishing

and what was shared in its framework of ethics and expectations that made possible intimate contact with a creature
so very different.” Plumwood, 2012, p. 51.
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long-term security, dominance, or control.39 We might then understand Treadwell’s project (and
other ethological projects) as social experiments that require co-exposure, vulnerability, and
intimate immersion in the worlds of other animals.40
Imposition or Invitation
The desire to live on the terms of other-than-human animals might also be read as an
imposition because it entails sharing physical space with these animals, which necessarily affects
and influences their behavior. Calarco is careful to note, however, that Hutto’s decision to live
with mule deer was inspired by an individual mule deer herself and “was not simply his own
imposition on the pack.”41 Calarco’s analysis of Hutto’s response to this invitation is very helpful
when thinking about whether or not Treadwell’s decision to live with the bears and foxes of
Alaska should be understood as an unwelcomed invasion, so it is worth quoting at length:
One doe in particular, which he named Rayme, was the one who initially broached the
gap separating Hutto’s and the deer’s social lives. Rayme took an unusual interest in
Hutto and his partner Leslye’s activities in their cabin and consistently sought out their
attention and contact. As Hutto notes, it was Rayme who signaled that another socius was
possible. He treated this invitation to be alongside and in the vicinity of the deer with
39

Treadwell can be rightly criticized for both his self-aggrandizing comments whereby he refers to himself
as the “master” of the bears as well as his more theatrical episodes whereby he seems to transform his practice of
living with bears into a challenge that reveals his strength and resourcefulness. However, I believe it is more fruitful
and fair to consider how these comments stand in stark contrast to the spirit of his engagement with these animals.
These comments are typically made when Treadwell is alone, in a heightened state of excitement following an
encounter with a bear, or when he is venting his frustrations about people who are critical of his project.
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I use co-exposure, vulnerability, and intimate immersion here for two reasons. First, I hope to give shape
to the spirit of Treadwell’s project and draw attention to the sacrificial and uncomfortable aspects of such work.
Secondly, I want to draw connections between Treadwell’s project and the focus that many pro-animal philosophers
place on beginning thought from a space that does not presuppose a dualistic or hierarchical opposition between
humans and other animals. Treadwell’s project represents the practical and material prongs of such a philosophy by
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animals in their vulnerability, fragility, and finitude. The tendency of philosophers to presuppose a dualistic
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caution and was careful not to force his way into the pack. Rather, by patiently realigning
the edges of their joint worlds and carefully occupying shared territory in a nonthreatening manner, Hutto was eventually accepted by Rayme and the other mule deer as
a member of their pack. . . He thus came to realize that the deep fear wild mule deer seem
to have of human beings can in fact be at least partially overcome through sustained
commitment to establishing alternative modes of relation.
We might pause to consider for a moment that in the case of Treadwell, the possibility of
sharing and co-creating socii with bears and foxes, was revealed or signaled by individual bears
and foxes themselves. While Treadwell originally went to Alaska to see bears after being
encouraged to do so by his friend, Terry Tabor (whom he claimed saved his life after a drug
overdose), he did not visit Alaska with the intention of living with them. 42 His decision to
attempt to live alongside these animals came after a series of encounters with bears that signaled
that it might be possible to cohabitate and build social bonds with these animals.
In Treadwell’s first encounter with a brown bear, the animal ran away immediately after
seeing him, which filled Treadwell with a combination of “elation” and “sadness.” 43 According
to him, he was excited by the encounter with such a beautiful and powerful animal but was
saddened by the bear’s decision to run from him because he felt that this animal’s fear was a
product of a long history of human violence enacted against these creatures. In Treadwell’s
second encounter, he was surprised by the appearance of a large bear and “fear enveloped
[him].”44 Instinctively, he slowly retreated while singly softly to the bear—which Treadwell
believed may have gestured some good will—before the animal decided to walk away from him
calmly. In his third encounter, a massive brown bear approached Treadwell and walked over him
while he was curled up in the fetal position. Treadwell was terrified throughout the encounter but
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expressed deep gratitude to the bear after he was allowed to live. These encounters revealed three
lessons to Treadwell: 1) fear is a barrier that inhibits positive interactions between humans and
bears; 2) not all bears are afraid of humans and seem to respond amicably to song and high
frequency sounds, and 3) bears have the capacity to be merciful and magnanimous rather than
blood-thirsty killers as many make them out to be. While it may be easier to think abstractly
about these encounters, it seems more appropriate to take pause and dwell with how powerful
and sublime these encounters must have been for Treadwell. Upon deep reflection, it is not
difficult to understand how one might interpret these three potentially lethal encounters with
three different bears, which ended peacefully, as immensely powerful gifts that indicate the
possibility of an alternative way of life alongside these animals.
In combination, these lessons revealed the possibility of co-constituting social
assemblages with bears, which Treadwell interpreted as an invitation to experiment with the
possibility of living with these animals. 45 These meaningful encounters also encouraged
Treadwell to envision a world in which humans and bears (as well as foxes) interacted with each
other without fear and violence, which inspired him to dedicate his life to living with these
animals and sharing the richness of his experiences with these animals with others. 46 In light of
these experiences, Treadwell decided to carefully and cautiously explore the possibility of co-

45

While it is reasonable to question whether it was correct or accurate for Treadwell to have interpreted this
encounter as an invitation, to dwell on this question would overlook the significance of these events. At the very
least, we must recognize that these encounters were inviting, even if we do not understand them as “genuine” or
“intentional” invitations as such. It is also important to note that the character of Treadwell’s engagement with these
animals throughout his time in Alaska left them with the power and space to revoke these “invitations.” Treadwell
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animals in this way allowed him to avoid potentially lethal encounters and gave him deep insight into the unique
personalities of these animals. This insight prevented him from thinking of bears in essentialist or abstract terms and
kept him from falling prey to the fantasy that all the bears (and foxes for that matter) were equally enthusiastic and
willing to engage with him socially.
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existing alongside these animals in a manner that might generate new social relations beyond the
initial fear that members of both species often experience and which increase the likelihood of
interspecies violence.47 He notes, however, that “the first priority of [his] work was to respect the
wishes of all of the animals in their wilderness home,” which often resulted in him “backing off”
from animals and giving them space. 48 However, as the story of Booble and her cubs illustrates,
the animals with whom he lived were agentive and often (co)facilitated the creation of social
bonds by following him and adjusting their behaviors in ways that revealed unprecedented trust
and affective relations. Throughout his book and his footage, Treadwell repeatedly emphasizes
that people would not engage in violence against these animals if they could understand the
richness of knowing them intimately and living among them. 49
With respect to the red foxes of Katmai, the possibility of building a socius was revealed
to Treadwell shortly after he decided to respond to the “invitation” of the bears and began his
first camping expedition in the park. In his book, Treadwell suggests that upon meeting an
adventurous fox who regularly sought him out and followed him around, he became aware of the
possibility of building a socius with him and members of his species. 50 Treadwell claims that the
fox (whom he named Timmy because he believed they shared the same bold spirit) initiated
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contact and invited the possibility of building an alternative way of life with him. In his book,
Treadwell illuminates the role that Timmy played in linking their social lives;
The pups obeyed and kept their distance except for one particularly ornery sibling who
sneaked closer and closer to me. . . Much to his parents’ dismay, he became more brazen
with each visit. . . The more I got to know the little bugger, the more I realized that the
disobedient flaming torpedo of terror was a lot like me. One day, after he’d left the
relative safety of the fox family’s domain to follow me, I had no doubt what to name him.
I called him Timmy the Fox.51
Treadwell mentions that Timmy’s adventurousness and willingness to build an
interspecies socius with him was passed on to his offspring and continued for multiple
generations, which led to more robust social relationships with various red foxes during
Treadwell’s thirteen years in the field.52 While some might say Treadwell’s decision to name
Timmy after himself might constitute a narcissistic and inappropriate imposition on the fox in the
form of anthropomorphism, I suggest that we resist reading this naming event in such a
manner.53 The issue of anthropomorphism and the ethical dimensions of Treadwell’s decision to
name other animals will be explored in more detail shortly.
Social Deterritorialization
A reader who remains convinced that Treadwell inappropriately imposed himself on the
bears and foxes of Katmai as a consequence of his decision to physically translocate to a region
uninhabited by humans, might find it helpful to think deeply about what ethological projects
involve. For Calarco, ethology is a practice that entails,
. . . a literal deterritorialization, a literal change of social and territorial location. Hutto
does not take mule deer out of their habitat and bring them into laboratory settings where
51
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they are more easily studied. Instead, he leaves his usual habitat behind and joins the deer
in their world and on their terrain, sacrificing the comfort of the familiar for the wonder
and astonishment of the unfamiliar. 54
Since literal deterritorialization is an aspect of any ethological project in which humans
live with animals in non-laboratory settings, it is difficult to critique Treadwell (or Hutto) on
these grounds without challenging ethological practice in principle. Also, since ethological
practice requires sacrificing the familiar, it seems difficult to think of Treadwell’s project (let
alone any ethological project of this sort) as an imposition on the animals with whom he lived,
since he was willing to allow these animals to largely dictate the terms and conditions of
interaction. While he did live with animals in their domain, Treadwell was willing to engage
with these other animals on their terms, relying solely on his ability to adapt and respond to these
animals, without relying on the use of weapons for self-defense (aside from the use of bear spray
in the early years of his expeditions). Treadwell’s approach was filled with humility and a deep
respect for the autonomy of these animals, which makes it difficult to narrowly conceive of what
he was doing as intrusive or impositional. It is also important to note that his presence was
temporary, ephemeral, and while he did have an impact on the local ecology and the behaviors of
the local animals, his presence was not coercive, nor did it compromise the integrity of the
environment.55 Moreover, Treadwell repeatedly emphasized that he was a visitor who was on
land that did not belong to him. This attitude comes to light in how he responds to Timmy the
Fox’s tendency to mark him and his equipment with urine; “Timmy raised a leg and squirted a

54

Calarco, forthcoming, p. 54.
Treadwell and Palovak, 1999, p. 111. Treadwell was known to alter the environment in minor ways (e.g.,
by rearranging creek rocks to allow fish to get through shallow water, so the bears would be able to fish more
easily). While Treadwell undoubtedly made other (intentional and unintentional) alterations to the environment, it is
clear that he, in principle, attempted to “leave no trace” during his time in Katmai; “Except for the trampled grass
around the campsite, I . . . left the wilderness without a trace.”
55

Ginsburg 21

friendly stream of urine to remind me that my campsite was his.” 56 This sort of humility is a
recurrent theme in Treadwell’s descriptions of his daily life amongst these animals in Alaska.
Calarco’s understanding of ethological deterritorialization also raises the question of what
sorts of imposition are acceptable, especially with respect to formal scientific research on
animals. While many are quick to criticize Treadwell for lacking formal scientific training and
for distracting or harassing the bears of Katmai, these critics often fail to criticize the far more
prevalent, more invasive, and directly harmful practices in which many trained scientists engage
(e.g., sedation, trapping, tagging, killing animals to “manage” populations, various experiments
that maim or kill animals in laboratory settings, etc.). One cannot legitimately criticize Treadwell
on the grounds of inappropriate imposition, without also leveling these same critiques at formal
scientific practices that are just as, if not more, imposing than Treadwell’s practices and quite
literally entail territorialization as well as the domination and control of other animals.
Moreover, it is important to note that unlike Treadwell and Hutto, many scientists are
unwilling to sacrifice the comfort of the familiar in favor of studying animals on their own
terms.57 Rather than superficiality criticizing Treadwell for being willing to live near the animals
he loved, we might instead celebrate Treadwell’s ethological practice as a viable alternative to
more imposing methods of relating to animals and acknowledge Treadwell’s impressive ability
to live in and embrace a precarious state of exposed vulnerability with other creatures. And,
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instead of thinking of Treadwell’s decision to live with bears “in their world(s)” as imposing, we
might more appropriately characterize it as a form of surrender that renounces the all-too-human
tendency to relate to animals in controlling and managerial fashions that insulate them from harm
and utterly fail to account for the interests of other animals.
Calarco goes on to claim that we should learn to read ethological projects like Hutto’s as
invitations to “practice a similar kind of ‘gay science,’ one that moves beyond a notion of
knowledge aimed at bringing what is strange back to oneself and that gestures instead toward a
form of inquiry and relation predicated on gratitude and reverence for that which is inhuman and
more-than-human.”58 Practicing this sort of joyful experimentation requires that we embrace
difference and learn to dwell in precarity, while taking fine risks aimed at revealing and
generating new and different relational possibilities with those who are typically devalued and
marginalized within the dominant social order.
While Treadwell, at times, may have misinterpreted or mischaracterized his relationships
with these animals, his footage with these creatures seems to speak for itself; he disclosed and
generated new and unprecedented sorts of relation with these animals that leave many who watch
his footage speechless. It is worth emphasizing again that these relationships were inherently
experimental and emerged from and through long-term social interactions, negotiations, and
quarrels, and resulted in the creation of unique interspecies socii. Treadwell’s footage, like
Hutto’s, documents a shared social product that was nurtured, maintained, and explored by both
human and more-than-human participants.
IV. Treadwell’s Environmental Ethology
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Environmental ethology, for Calarco, is concerned with “analy[zing] human-animal
relations within their environmental milieu.”59 By revealing the contingency and transformative
potential of socii, Calarco suggests that ethological projects like Hutto’s encourages us to rethink
“our relations not just with deer and other animals but with micro- and macro-relations at all
levels, human and nonhuman beings, living and dead, intra-individual and ecological, and
beyond.”60 In other words, once one is exposed to the fluidity of social relations, one cannot help
but consider how relations at other levels might be reconsidered and reshaped. Analyses of this
sort demand that ethological practitioners recognize the constraints, opportunities, and
possibilities presented by specific environmental contexts and that they learn to be attentive to
the ecological aspects of human-animal relations.
Ecological Indistinction and Functional Ontological Pluralism
Calarco emphasizes that Hutto’s deep long-term engagement with mule deer opened him
up to understanding the deer in terms of their specific ecological niche and environmental
relations to the point that he “starts to see the deer as indiscernible from those relations.” 61 As
Hutto himself states, “this singular vision of a creature so perfectly interwoven into the ecology
instantly transformed the way in which I perceived this remarkable animal, but also forever
changed my understanding of its significance as an indivisible component within the
landscape.”62 Treadwell experienced similar revelations throughout his time in “nature’s secret
classrooms” where he learned to appreciate the degree to which Alaskan brown bears (and red
foxes) live in “perfect harmony with their environment.”63 This recognition encouraged him to
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consider ecological preservation and environmental activism to be essential aspects of his life
work aimed at protecting other-than-human animals. 64
This ecological indistinction, does not erase or obscure either Hutto’s or Treadwell’s
appreciation of the singularity and uniqueness of nonhuman animals at the level of the
individual, the population, the species, or the socius, however. We might understand this
ecological insight as an additional layer of understanding that is simultaneously informed by and
gives shape to both of their approaches to ethological practice as well as their understandings of
the world. This is a keen insight, because it points to how ethological practice subverts attempts
to understand other animals or the world in general using any single scientific perspective
(physical, chemical, physiological, neurological, organismal, ecological, etc.) or ontological
scale, and reveals the inherently multiscalar, pluralistic, palimpsestic, and intersectional aspects
of ethological work. Calarco refers to the practice of moving between ontological scales as
functional ontological pluralism. In his words,
. . . there can be no priority given here to one ontological perspective over another. It is
not a matter of determining whether objects, singularities, or relations are most basic—all
of these ontological levels must constantly be borne in mind to practice ethology. 65
Hutto and Treadwell embrace functional ontological pluralism by thinking at each of
these levels and gracefully moving between them, since a comprehensive understanding of the
enworldments of mule deer, brown bears, and red foxes requires thinking through each of these
scales individually and with respect to one another. Treadwell employs a similar skill by using
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multiple scientific lenses during his time with these animals. For example, throughout Among
Grizzlies, he frequently shifts from analyzing the personalities and behaviors of individual
animals, to seasonal behavioral changes, to intra and interspecies social dynamics, to physiology,
to ecological relations, to environmental concerns, and so on.66
In addition to helping provide a more comprehensive understanding of various
enworldments, Calarco believes that this ontological pluralism emerges from ethological practice
out of social necessity because, in order to be “fully responsible” to a group of nonhuman
animals, one must appreciate that they are “irreducibly nested within these various ontological
relations.”67 Treadwell demonstrated an intense appreciation of these various ontological
relations and frequently moved between these perspectives.
Attending to Anthropogenic Environmental Degradation
By embracing functional ontological pluralism and attending to ecological contexts,
Treadwell was able to develop a deeper appreciation of how human activity affects nonhuman
animals. For example, Treadwell’s practice of environmental ethology inspired him to engage in
conservation and preservation efforts aimed at protecting large swaths of land from development
and urbanization, because he keenly understood that in order to protect the individual animals he
loved, he would have to protect the environments in which they were enmeshed. 68 It might also
be noted that environmental ethology is practiced with relative ease when one is engaging
ethologically with animals that require as much space as Alaskan brown bears do. It is widely
emphasized by conservationists, biologists, and ecologists, for instance, that these bears require
relatively large amounts of space, fill important functional niches in Alaskan ecologies, and are
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typically considered keystone species.69 As such, those who study bears in intimate fashions (as
amateurs or as professionals) frequently think about these animals in terms of multi-species
conservation efforts, the maintenance of biodiversity, and their trophic relations. The tendency
for amateur and professional ethologists to think of bears in conservational and ecological terms
make it difficult to think about human-bear relations outside of their environmental milieu and
seem to require a sustained engagement with the questions of how humans affect this milieu and
how they might affect it differently.
Given the vulnerability of both mule deer populations and brown bear populations, both
Hutto and Treadwell, respectively, are deeply engaged with issues of ecological degradation as
well as human policies and practices (e.g., animal management practices), which place individual
animals in harm’s way using ecological justifications. With respect to their written work, both
Touching the Wild and Among Grizzlies are deeply concerned with opening up their readers to
how their daily decisions might contribute to violence against these animals indirectly with the
hope of inspiring people to live their lives in view of such violence. 70 It is important to
emphasize here that, for both of them, their engagements with various forms of anthropogenic
environmental issues stems directly from their social engagement with animals. As such, it is
important that we make salient the connection between social ethology and environmental
ethology.
As Calarco points out, given the violent, systemic practices of particular human groups
that do great damage to these animals and the environments in which they live, social ethology is
“conceptually, practically, and ethically” connected to environmental ethology. While
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environmental ethology informs and constrains the social possibilities that might be enacted
materially, social ethology feeds back into environmental ethology by generating new ecological
relations. The environmental ethological dimensions of both Hutto and Treadwell reveal the need
to dramatically restructure dominant ways of life in view of the plights of these animals. As
Calarco puts it, “To take seriously the situation of animals today is to be immediately opened
onto the realm of environmental ethology and the challenge of radically reconstituting our
collective relations with the ecologies in which we find ourselves.” 71 One of Treadwell’s primary
goals was to reveal the manners by which we might alter our ecological relationships in ways
that allow for other animals to have more space and more livable environments. 72 It is important
to note that part of what is at stake in Treadwell’s project is a glimpse of a minimalist way of life
that does not participate in many of the most environmentally egregious and violent practices of
the dominant culture. While Treadwell relied on goods produced in factories and contributed to
climate change through travel, he lived a relatively simple, ecologically-minded life. He avoided
excessive consumption and consciously avoided the practices that he knew would negatively
affect the environments and bodies of the animals he loved. As such, Treadwell’s decision to live
his life differently in light of ecological concerns might be understood as a transformation
stemming from the practice of environmental ethology.
Ethical Pluralism
It is interesting to note that Treadwell became keenly aware of how his actions would
affect the local ecology throughout his time in Alaska and used this awareness to deeply consider
how his actions would affect individual animals, their social groups, and extant ecological
relationships. During his time living with the brown bears and red foxes of Katmai, Treadwell
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constantly negotiated and renegotiated his relationships with individual bears, the bear
population as a whole, and extant ecological relations in ways that reflect an appreciation for
local ecology without hypostatizing the extant ecological relationships or reifying simple, static
boundaries between culture and nature or between humans and animals. Treadwell seemed to
practice a functional ontological and ethical pluralism when confronted with ethical encounters
with other animals.73 For example, when confronted with the problem of an injured bear, whom
he called Mickey, Treadwell was unsure how to both attend to this animal’s woundedness while
respecting natural selective pressures and the local ecology. He elaborates on this when he says;
Now his back limbs seemed to be useless . . . His condition crushed me, but I felt
helpless. I have always believed in letting natural selection take its course. Nature may be
cruel from moment to moment, but its overall effect is to create balance. However,
Mickey’s predicament forced me to find a compromise.74
This passage reflects how seriously and thoughtfully Treadwell engaged with
evolutionary and ecological principles, while simultaneously recognizing that he influenced
these processes. For him, it was not a question of whether or not he influenced these processes,
but of how he influenced them. This approach reveals a nuanced understanding of how humans
interact with ecology that does not reify an uncritical or untenable commitment to the belief that
nature and culture are or ought to be separate. Even more, this passage captures the ethical
ambiguity and uncertainty that emerges from intimate relationships with other animals.
Treadwell’s desire to find a compromise reveals one of the intense paradoxes he was exposed to
during his time with these animals.
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As Calarco points out, these sorts of paradoxes emerge from ethological practice itself,
especially when one comes to love the animals with whom one lives and engages. Interestingly,
Treadwell’s tendency to see himself as part of these relations (without justifying any and all
forms of engagement) has inspired attacks from critics (many of whom are scientists) that are
committed to the belief that humans should not “interfere” or influence these processes at all,
which oftentimes betrays a commitment to an outmoded belief in a simple nature-culture
distinction or the inappropriate (and anti-ethological) notion that the ideal way to study or
understand a an organism, population, system, or process is from a transcendent or objective
external position—which has been challenged by many theorists and ethologists, including
Donna Haraway, Jane Goodall, Jeanne Altmann, Barbara Smuts, Val Plumwood, and Joe Hutto
among others.75 Thus, these critics must be very careful with respect to how they challenge the
legitimacy of Treadwell’s methods and insights.
Moreover, the compromise Treadwell came to with respect to how to deal with Mickey
and work through his competing commitments to individual bears, the population of bears, and
ecological processes reveals Treadwell’s focus on negotiability while simultaneously addressing
the concern that the bears gained nothing from Treadwell’s presence. After recognizing that
Mickey was injured and that there was a strong possibility that he could be killed by one of the
other, larger bears, Treadwell decided to intervene in the situation:
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I slowly reacquainted myself with Mickey, singing soft, gentle songs of love and praise. I
herded him in the direction of the nutritious grass near my tent. He didn’t seem nervous,
and at my prodding slowly dragged himself onto the sedge grass. Mickey began to feed
while I stood guard. I left him alone while keeping an eye out for any intruders. If larger
bears attempted to dominate Mickey, I stepped out and calmly dissuaded them. 76
Treadwell goes on to say that he continued to “guard” Mickey during the daytime for a
number of consecutive days, while the bear recovered, ate, and slept close to his tent. Treadwell
embraced the ambiguity of the situation and recognized that there was not a clear and correct
answer with respect to how he should respond to Mickey’s plight. He chose to attend to this
animal’s vulnerability and pain by placing his own body in harm’s way on his behalf. It is
important, I think, that we do not dismiss the sacrificial beauty of this gesture. While we cannot
expect everyone to care for other wounded animals (be they human or more-than-human) in this
manner, it is important that we recognize the power of such a gesture and respect it, without
dismissing it as an act of insanity or attacking Treadwell for “violating” the bears or natural
processes. It is also important to note that Treadwell himself refers to this act as an act of
interference— “As Mickey healed, I thought about my interference with nature. It was of little
consequence to the Grizzly Sanctuary as a whole. But in my heart, it seemed right and felt
good.”77 While we might interpret this statement as revealing a commitment to a sort of natureculture binary, this interpretation is undercut from within by Treadwell’s recognition that
interference in non-human processes should not be conceived of as universally unacceptable or
inappropriate. Treadwell struggled through the situation and embraced a sort of ontological
pluralism by moving between thinking about his responsibilities to a particular, individual
organism, a population of bears (by attending to the significance of natural selection), and to
larger ecological processes, before deciding how to find a compromise that engaged with each of
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these levels of responsibility. Rather than helping Mickey by feeding him or attempting to
directly address his wounds, he decided to compromise by creating the conditions by which
Mickey could heal on his own by deterring potential threats, which directly benefited Mickey
without denying or ignoring the bear’s autonomy.
In light of this example, we might recognize that Treadwell’s functional ontological
pluralism—his ability to think along different ontological registers—required a corresponding
functional ethical pluralism as well. As Treadwell’s engagement with Mickey illustrates, how a
practitioner of ethical pluralism responds to individuals, social groups, or processes, for instance,
requires one to engage with the unique responsibilities that one feels toward various sorts of
entities. In turn, this ethical pluralist must allow each of these unique responsibilities to inform
their ethical decisions and dwell in the “spandrelic” in-between spaces that emerge as byproducts of their competing ethical sensibilities before making an ethical decision. 78
For example, a particular ethical action might be appropriate from one ontological level
but might contradict one’s ethical responsibilities at another ontological level of consideration.
Moving between these ontological and ethical worlds seems to require that a practitioner of such
pluralism learns to embrace ambiguity, uncertainty, and contradiction. Gloria Anzaldúa describes
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this space as la nepantla (which is a Nahuatl word meaning, “middle” or “in-between space).79
Anzaldúa suggests that the person who dwells in such an in-between space might be understood
as la nepantlera. Neplanteras dwell in this space while moving between worlds and perspectives.
While Anzaldúa focuses primary on social and subjective world-traversing, the concepts of la
nepantla and la nepantlera seem to be appropriate for capturing the paradoxical and antinomic
aspects of the ontological and ethical pluralisms that emerge directly from ethological practice.
We might understand these interstitial spaces and the ethical decisions that emerge from them as
deeply nepantlic.
Another example shows how Treadwell was not always willing to make compromises out
of respect for his ethical commitments toward social groups, populations, and extant ecological
relations. For example, after watching a “feeble and scrawny” cub struggling to keep up with its
mother, Treadwell dwelled in the spandrelic and nepantlic space between his antinomic and
competing ethical commitments before ultimately deciding that he would not interfere or make
any compromises on behalf of the cub. For Treadwell,
I wanted to rescue the cub and nurse it back to health in a more caring environment, but I
knew that couldn’t be. Back in the Grizzly Sanctuary I had aided Mickey, but there was
no way I could come between a mother and her cub. This time I was just going to have to
follow the rules of nature, terrible as they may be.
In this case, Treadwell’s sentimentality was restrained by his commitment to maintaining
the integrity of the local ecology. His decision to follow the “rules of nature” might be
understood as an indication of his attempt to live kata phusin—in accordance with nature and
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natural processes—without attempting to manage or impose his own conceptions of order on
other animals or more-than-human processes. 80 Treadwell’s approach to resolving challenging
ethical situations required astonishing degrees of humility and attentiveness while demanding
that he learn to embrace ambiguity, discomfort, and in many cases intense emotional agony.
Treadwell’s Sentimental Ecology
During his time in the Grizzly Sanctuary, Treadwell also came to appreciate the
unpredictable contingency and cyclical flux of the weather, tides, and food resources. 81 During a
memorable segment of Treadwell’s footage depicted in the film Grizzly Man, Treadwell
expresses his intense frustration with respect to a lack of rain because he knew that the bears
were so deeply enmeshed with their environments that even a minor drought would increase the
mortality of these animals.82 Treadwell’s detailed accounts of grizzly bear fishing practices,
foraging behaviors, and of trophic relations (especially the ecological role that bears played in
making clams and fish scraps available for consumption by red foxes and scavenging birds) also
reveal his ecological awareness and sustained engagement in environmental ethology. 83
While Treadwell, at times, might have placed a mistaken emphasis on the harmony and
balance of nature,84 he repeatedly reminded himself that nature is oftentimes unforgiving, hostile,
and indifferent, which is something many critics of Treadwell (including his documentarian,
Werner Herzog) seem to overlook (intentionally or otherwise). 85 Treadwell has been criticized
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for both harboring anti-ecological views (deriving from his allegedly “inappropriate”
sentimentality and his alleged desire to fuse or become one with bears) and for maintaining an
uncritical belief in a dualistic relationship between culture and nature. 86 Under close scrutiny,
however, it becomes apparent that these attacks fail to capture the complexity of Treadwell’s
attitudes and practices. While Treadwell did have difficulty embracing the death of the animals
he loved, he seems to accept the ecological necessity of death.
For example, in Death in the Grizzly Maze: The Timothy Treadwell Story, Mike Lapinski
recounts a story he was told by a biologist named Tom Smith, who regularly harassed
Treadwell.87 Upon stumbling upon a dead brown bear cub, Smith and another biologist decided
to berate Treadwell and coax him out of his tent by shaking the tent pole and yelling, “I know
you’re in there, Tim. Come on out. One of your bears is dead.” 88 As Treadwell frantically
emerged from the tent, Smith “told him, with tongue in cheek, ‘Tim, you’re supposed to be
protecting these bears, but you’re not doing a very good job of it. I just found a dead cub a
hundred yards from your tent.” According to Smith, “Tim got all serious and spread his arms and
said, ‘Hey, that’s nature!’”89
Treadwell’s critics conveniently overlook these events, because they not only reveal the
psychological and emotional abuse that he was subjected to by professional scientists, but they
also serve as testaments of his acceptance of the necessity of death as an unavoidable aspect of
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participating in ecological flows. It is also interesting that many of these same critics also claim
that Treadwell either had a death wish, was insane, or did not properly value his own life,
without recognizing that Treadwell’s acceptance of his finitude and his approach to death can be
understood as an unmistakably ecological attitude; an attitude that is clearly deeper and more
sound than the attitudes of many of these critics whose lifestyles and practices do not
acknowledge, let alone embrace, human edibility and ecological participation.
Many critics cite footage of Treadwell crying over the dead body of a red fox kit who
was torn apart by wolves as evidence of his anti-ecological sentimentality. 90 It seems odd,
however, to claim that expressions of sentimentality—especially in the form of mourning—
necessarily reflect unsound ecological views. For example, if sentimentality and sound
ecological attitudes are incompatible, then ecologists who mourn the loss of close family
members or companion animals should be held to the same standard as Treadwell and reminded
that such sentimentality simply indicates a failure to recognize the ecological necessity of death.
This expectation seems to be inappropriate, however. And, if we appreciate the love that
Treadwell felt toward these animals, it is just as inappropriate to criticize him for grieving over
the dead body of a baby fox, especially one whose family he had known and loved for years. 91
Those who are critical of Treadwell’s sentimentality, might also recognize that even
Charles Darwin was filled with wonder in recognition of the compassion, emotion, and empathy
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that he discovered throughout his time studying the more-than-human world. 92 The attempt to
characterize Treadwell as a naïve sentimental idealist who could not come to grips with the
cruelty of the natural world seems to assume that the world can be reduced to “chaos, hostility,
and murder.”93 Treadwell, however, recognized that the world is far more than chaotic, hostile,
and murderous; his project reveals the immeasurable richness and surprising amount of
harmonious interaction expressed between members of the same species, across species lines,
and between individual animals and their environments. During his time in Katmai, Treadwell
witnessed and generated untold joys, affects, and shared passions that render his decision to
focus on the more harmonious aspects of the natural world while mourning the deaths of other
animals both reasonable and ecologically sound. 94
V. Treadwell’s Mental Ethology
Mental ethology, according to Calarco, “investigates the various practices that form and
reform the character and subjective constitution of an individual animal, whether human or
more-than-human.”95 Rather than thinking of subjectivity as being fixed or “identities as being
relatively stable and persistent across time,” we might instead think of “an individual’s
subjective constitution as perhaps being more plastic, and identity as something that is
accomplished and built across time and that remains fundamentally open to future negotiations
and new forms.”96 The plasticity and fundamental openness of identity become more salient in
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view of subjective transformations that stem from powerful events or encounters with others. For
example, a human person might become indelibly marked and subjectively transformed after
witnessing an extreme act of violence or generosity. From this example, we might think of
subjectivity as something that is capable of being disrupted and affected through encounters with
others. While most people site events and encounters with other humans as the most
transformative ones in their lives, there is no good reason to ignore or dismiss mental
transformations that often stem from experiences with more-than-human others. 97
Calarco points to a series of mental transformations that Hutto underwent during his time
living with mule deer to illustrate the ways in which ethological practice can generate
unanticipatable dehabituations (i.e., changes of habit and practice) as well as resubjectifications
(i.e., changes in subjective constitution, personality, and identity) that influence and transform
the behaviors and perspectives of individual animals. Treadwell as well as individual bears and
foxes underwent transformations throughout his time in Katmai. These sorts of individual
transformations fed into larger social transformations, which altered the properties, capacities,
and characters of the socii in which Treadwell participated.
It is also important to note that from this perspective, dehabituation and resubjectification
are processes that are shared by individual animals that emerge from shared affects.98 This is a
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crucial point, because many analyses of Treadwell tend to focus on how he affected the bears
without recognizing the reciprocal aspects of affective events. In other words, affects are always
double and shared. Treadwell did not simply impose one-directional pressures on other animals
that bent them to his will—rather, he changed alongside these animals as they shared space,
negotiated boundaries, and influenced one another. Ethological practice, then, might be
understood as a series of experiments with new and different subjectivities, which allow for new
potentials and relations to unfold. These new and different subjectivities, however, are
oftentimes unanticipatable. Even when one practices ethology (particularly mental ethology)
with an open mind, one is often surprised by the subjective and perspectival transformations that
unfold through such practice. Treadwell was frequently surprised by other animals during his
time in Katmai, which deepened his appreciation for them while exposing him to unsuspected
joys and pains.
As Calarco points out, the processes of dehabituations and resubjectifications that take
hold of Hutto and transform his life were “initiated not by Hutto himself but by encounters with
the mule deer.”99 The most potent transformations emerged from ethical encounters initiated by
injured and vulnerable mule deer. Calarco draws special attention to how encounters with
animals in such precarious situations served to,
alert him to their finitude, fragility, and singularity and call him out of habituated modes
of knowing and loving that tend to cancel radical singularity . . . these encounters draw
Hutto out of himself and into new epistemological processes of subjectification. 100
We might recall that Treadwell’s encounters with injured and vulnerable animals
(particularly Mickey and the frail cub mentioned previously) affected Treadwell in a similar
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fashion. These encounters drew him out of himself and demanded that he attend to their
vulnerability, even if he ultimately decided that it was not his place to interfere after dwelling in
the borderlands between his various ethical commitments. These encounters challenged
Treadwell in ways that forced him to think from the perspectives of these other animals—in
ways that “irrevocably changed” his “frame of reference.” 101 The ability to travel between
subjective worlds and embrace epistemological pluralism stemmed from a handful of
transformative affective encounters with other animals. While Treadwell was constantly exposed
to new perspectives during his time in Katmai, some of his most potent transformations stemmed
from feelings of intense gratitude toward bears and intense shame toward his complicity in forms
of anthropogenic violence.
Re-Bjorn
Some of Treadwell’s most transformative encounters with other animals were ones that
filled him with intense feelings of gratitude and love. Treadwell’s third encounter with a bear
during his initial trip to Alaska (which, we might recall, taught him his third lesson: that bears
have the capacity to be merciful and magnanimous and are not merely blood-thirsty killers as
many make them out to be), was one such encounter.
When Treadwell was on his way back to his camp after encountering the two previous
bears, he was approached by a massive male grizzly bear. His attempts to withdraw from the
animal were denied by the bear’s quick encroaching steps and he was almost immediately
overcome. Treadwell responded by “falling down hard, face first” and “curl(ing) into the fetal
position.”102 Treadwell, paralyzed with terror, could not move— he found himself in a state of
absolute vulnerability in which he was at the mercy of the powerful creature. While still curled,
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Treadwell peered through his fingers which were covering his face and gazed upon the immense
battle-scarred bear who stood over him. Treadwell, trembling, watched helplessly as the giant
breathed him in. Then, “ever so gently, [the bear] stepped over [his] quivering body . . . and
vanished in the direction of the river.”103 Treadwell was shaken by this meeting and was slow to
rise, but after he did, he returned to his camp “all the while chanting, ‘Thank you, bears . . .
thank you, bears.’”104 Treadwell considered this encounter—and the bear’s decision to let him
live—to be a gift. When this bear spared his life, he was reborn for the first time. 105 He
recognized that bears, while capable of great aggression and violence, were also capable of great
compassion and mercy. It was this realization that encouraged him to study bears obsessively
until he returned the following season for his first official “expedition” where he camped in
solitude among the bears of the “Grizzly Sanctuary.” While he desired more than anything to
help protect the bears that had changed his life, he still had an alcohol addiction that he knew
would impede his efforts.
It was during his first “official” expedition that he met and grew quite fond of a bear,
whom he named “Booble.” Among other things, Booble and her cub Beacon were the first bears
with whom Treadwell built profound connections. Treadwell learned how to swim across a river
by following Booble’s example and also shared several moments of vulnerability with Booble
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and Beacon that affected him acutely.106 Treadwell attributed one of these moments to his
decision to permanently abstain from alcohol for the rest of his life.
Treadwell recalled a particular day on which “[he] begged [Booble] for her help” as she
dug for clams beside him.107 While he cried, he expressed his worry that he would “never really
be [her] defender because [he couldn’t] t stop drinking.” 108 As she listened to this utterance,
Treadwell says that Booble moved closer to him while she continued to dig. As he existed with
her in a suspended state of mutual trust where they “could not have been more vulnerable,”
Treadwell looked at Booble and pledged that “[He would] stop drinking for [Booble] and for all
bears,” and that he would “stop and devote [his] life” to them. Upon completing his pledge,
Booble responded in an “extraordinary” way— “with a playful swat, she flipped a clam shell
over to [him].”109 He kept these “treasures” and considered this to be another rebirth that instilled
a sense of purpose in his life. When he returned to society after this expedition, no longer did he
live his life in a drunken stupor, instead he “had dreams, goals, hopes, and a reason to live.” 110
Booble and the giant male grizzly from his first encounter gave him life, and he was determined
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to “devote it to bears, to animals of every stripe, and to ecological preservation.” 111 These
transformations corresponded to massive changes in Treadwell’s habits and subjective
constitution. In addition to the transformative power of gracious and loving encounters, however,
Treadwell also underwent mental transformations in response to encounters that filled him with
feelings of shame.
Transformative Shame, Becoming-Animal, and Mental Indistinction
According to Calarco, the encounters that emerge from Hutto’s ethological practice
revealed “the possibility of establishing a fundamentally different form of life that begins by
displacing standard anthropocentric perspectives and identities.” 112 Some of the most profound
encounters that Treadwell had with bears and foxes that challenged his anthropocentrism were
ones that filled him with intense feelings of shame. The transformative power of shame is
revealed by Treadwell’s first encounter with a bear, whereby the bear ran away from him
immediately upon seeing him. In his words,
It was the briefest of encounters, the first time that I stood near a truly wild beast. My
heart was pounding and I was shaken, both equally elated and saddened by the meeting.
Elated, for it was my dream come true to meet a bear in the wilderness. Sad, because as
imposing as the bear was, it was afraid of me. In the wilderness, this bear should be
frightened of nothing. Yet a brief glimpse of a human had caused it to flee. The message
was clear to me. After decades of adversity caused by man, the bear was wary of people.
For me, the encounter was like looking into a mirror. I gazed into the face of a kindred
soul, a being that was potentially lethal, but in reality was just as frightened as I was. 113
In this encounter, Treadwell was opened up to a perspective that subverted his all-toohuman identity. For the first time, it was revealed to him that he could inspire fear in an animal

111

Treadwell and Palovak, 1999, p. 34.
Calarco, forthcoming, p. 61.
113
Treadwell and Palovak, 1999, p. 10; Lapinski, p. 3. Unsurprisingly, many critics of Treadwell, including
Lapinski, fail to acknowledge why Treadwell was so moved by this bear’s decision to flee from him. In fact,
Lapinski does not even mention Treadwell’s sadness, and instead, claims that Treadwell felt “successful and, in fact,
elated when each bear veered away from him into the brush” (p.3).
112

Ginsburg 43

as powerful and imposing as an Alaskan brown bear. Rather than invoking feelings of power and
dominance in Treadwell, however, he was filled with a deep sadness at what he took to be the
woundedness of a fellow creature who was the progeny of a long line of animals who had been
systematically abused by humans.114 In this moment, Treadwell glimpsed the world from the
bear’s eyes, which inspired him to think deeply about how he might convey to these bears that he
meant them no harm.
The shame Treadwell felt in the wake of this encounter left an indelible mark upon him
and inspired him to live his life in view of the anthropogenic violence regularly enacted against
these animals by the dominant culture. Perhaps more significantly, however, this shame
encouraged Treadwell to think beyond his own individual habits toward collective and
systematic transformations aimed at opening up space for these and other animals to flourish. He
founded Grizzly People, became a vocal environmental activist, and decided to document the
rich lives of bears in an effort to inspire the largescale change that he deemed necessary to
preserve these animals and their habitats; he did all of this while using his body and good will to
show the world that the anthropogenic fissure between these species can be mended with love,
respect, and patience.
As Calarco points out, Hutto experienced similar feelings of shame when he considered
the violence enacted against mule deer by humans, especially the practices he found himself
complicit in. While Hutto began his ethological experiment with mule deer as an avid hunter
who “insist[ed] on the legitimacy of hunting mule deer and wish[ed] to help maintain this
114
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practice in a sustainable manner in the future,” over time, he came to “view hunting from the
inside of the mule deer pack, wondering whether he too has been in the crosshairs of a hunter’s
rifle” at some point during his ethological project. 115 While Treadwell himself was never a
hunter or hunting advocate, he became increasingly opposed to hunting practices (especially
poaching) during his time in Katmai because his intimate knowledge of bears and foxes rendered
the conception of killing one for sport untenable.
In his book, Treadwell recounted the feelings that overtook him on a particular evening
while he was reading a book about “a man and his passion for killing bears.” 116 He described the
rage he felt while reading descriptions of bear-killing methods and seeing pictures of
“slaughtered bears and their smiling killers.” 117 The words and images made him physically sick
and left him deeply troubled for the rest of the evening. After realizing that Mr. Chocolate had
bedded down near his tent for the night, however, he decided to sit down near the bear outside
his tent. He then told the giant bear, “Tonight I’ve been reading about animal killers. Many
people would love to kill you, Mr. Chocolate. I’m ashamed to be human! I want to be like you,
wild and free, liberated from the wicked ways of people.” 118 While Treadwell recognized that he
was not directly responsible for these human practices, he felt sullied by them and was inspired
to challenge and scornfully resist them. 119
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In both his book and footage, Treadwell emphasizes his desire to help others appreciate
the wonder and beauty of these animals. 120 He repeatedly emphasizes that people would not hunt
these animals if they had even the faintest appreciation for the richness of these animals’ worlds.
For instance, in the film Grizzly Man, Treadwell addresses the issues of fox hunting and fur
farming by drawing attention to the bond he shares with Timmy the Fox. 121 He goes on to state,
Between Timmy the Fox, this beautiful fox, and me, we ask the public, please stop killing
and hurting these foxes and torturing them. Don't you think? If they knew how beautiful
he was, and how sweet he was, they would never hurt him. 122
Timmy’s affective capacities and rich emotional life inspired Treadwell to advocate on
his behalf. He emphasizes both his beauty and his unique personality to suggest to the viewer
that foxes are often killed because people have failed to attend to these animals in ways that
would foster appreciation of them. It is important to note that Treadwell appears to be in deep
anguish as he talks about the horrors of these practices. According to Calarco, Hutto “sees and
feels with the deer, utterly immersed in their individual pain and shared grief.” In Hutto’s words,
Now, when a bullet passes through the body of one of my family members . . . there is no
more displacement or refuge from my attachment—that mindless, objective space where
previously my emotions would have safely resided. Now there is only the shared pain and
agony and the loss of one that I care for deeply.123
Like Hutto, there is nowhere Treadwell can go to escape from the pain of knowing that
the animals he loves are suffering and dying needlessly due to violent human practices. He has
spent so much time with these animals that he feels the urge to do whatever he can to prevent
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them from being killed unnecessarily. The mental indistinction of this shared agony and the
desire to live one’s life in view of it is beautifully described by Deleuze and Guattari, who might
describe Treadwell’s shame and agony-driven desire to act on behalf of these animals as an
instance of becoming-animal:
We think and write for the animals themselves. We become animal so that the animal
becomes something else. The agony of a rat or the slaughter of a calf remains present in
thought not through pity but as the zone of exchange between the human and the animal
in which something of the one passes into the other. This is the constitutive relationship
of philosophy with non-philosophy. Becoming is always double, and it is this double
becoming that constitutes a people to come and the new land. 124
The agony that Treadwell shared with these fellow exposed and vulnerable creatures
served as the animating force behind his efforts to generate new possibilities for the animals he
loved. He could not bear the idea of passively allowing these animals to suffer and die around
him, which inspired him to act in view of their suffering. Treadwell became-animal to liberate
the more-than-human world into new potentials beyond regular exposure to intense
anthropogenic violence.
It is important to recognize that Treadwell frequently made reference to his humanity and
the various differences that existed between himself and other animals, which undercuts claims
that he was attempting to achieve oneness with bears, foxes, or the natural world in general. 125
While some of his comments can be read as revealing the desire to fuse with bears and foxes, it
seems more appropriate to understand them as being driven by a desire to become-other; that is,
to become-animal in such a way that he would both be able to survive alongside wild animals
and overcome the kind of humanness that has come to define the dominant culture (especially in
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the United States). His close friend and ecologist, Marnie Gaede, for instance, said that “he
wanted to become like the bear.”126 In a letter sent to Gaede, which she reads aloud in the film
Grizzly Man, Treadwell proclaimed, “I must mutually mutate into a wild animal to handle the
life I live out here.”
Treadwell’s focus on “mutual mutation” reflects his understanding of how his
relationship with these animals—a relationship characterized by becoming-animal—involved a
double (i.e., mutual, reciprocal, shared) becoming. He recognized that in order to survive and to
generate robust ways of life with other animals, practitioners of ethology must meet these
creatures on their terms and be willing to change alongside them. Rather than wrongly criticizing
Treadwell for desiring to fuse with these creatures, we might instead emphasize how willing he
was to sacrifice aspects of his humanity and human privilege in favor of an exposed existence
that scorned the comforts of society and blurred the lines between human and animal. Treadwell
balanced a recognition of his difference from bears with a deep appreciation of the fact that he
was becoming something-other, something deeply indistinct (i.e., unrecognizably human, bear,
or fox), through his immersive project;
My strategy is one of complete immersion within the hierarchy of bears that is both
respectful and peaceful. It would be quite interesting to know what the bears think I am;
whether they consider me just another bear, an animal like Timmy the Fox, or something
altogether different. Whatever their evaluation, it is abundantly clear that most of the
bears I live among either tolerate me, or enjoy my company. 127
Based on this passage, it is clear, that Treadwell did not believe that he was a bear in any
literal or naïve sense. He did, however, recognize that individual bears treated him in fashions that
were indistinguishable from how they treated other bears. It is important to note that he was humble
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enough to recognize his epistemic limitations and did not simply assume that the bears were
treating him like another bear because they thought he was a member of their species. Instead, he
embraced agnosticism with respect to why the bears treated him the way that they did. This
indistinguishable treatment seems to reveal the mental fluidity of the bears, who, through spending
time with Treadwell, underwent parallel changes in their behaviors, attitudes, and personalities,
which resulted in unprecedented and novel interspecies becomings.
Treadwell was able to embrace the differences between himself and the bears while
simultaneously recognizing the ways in which he and the bears were dynamic and capable of
changing one another. This ability reflects a profound interspecies mental indistinction. whereby
his subjective world and the subjective worlds of bears seemed to blend, interact, and become
indiscernible from one another.
Perhaps the single most illuminating encounter that filled Treadwell with a sense of
shame was an encounter with a male bear whom he called Cupcake. When Cupcake was an
adolescent, he made a habit of bluff-charging Treadwell, which led to many tense and uneasy
encounters. After a series of close calls, Cupcake eventually charged Treadwell while he was
near his tent. Treadwell responded by spraying the bear with pepper spray;
He coughed in agony, rolling his head in the grass. I was beside myself, miserable at
being responsible for Cupcake’s suffering. I called to Cupcake, almost crying. I’m sorry,
Cake! You scared me! 128
After spraying him a second time and chasing him with a stick, Cupcake finally ran
away, but Treadwell was deeply distraught by this encounter. Treadwell eventually came to
believe that carrying bear spray was incompatible with his desire to respect and live with these
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animals on their terms. 129 It seems reasonable to assume that the shame he felt after using his
bear spray on Cupcake was a crucial aspect of his decision to stop carrying bear spray during his
expeditions. It does not seem unlikely that the agony Treadwell shared with Cupcake inspired
him to surrender himself completely to the animals he loved.
The shame Treadwell felt when confronted with his direct and indirect participation in
violence against animals led to massive and permanent changes in his habits and subjective
constitution. Contrary to the condemnations of many of his critics, Treadwell did not impose
himself on these animals; he was willing to make sacrifices and alter his behaviors if it meant
that the lives of bears and foxes would be enriched. Treadwell became-animal—he became-bear
and he became-fox—with the intention of creating new possibilities for the creatures who saved
him from himself and filled his life with meaning. The character of his ethological project and
his decision to attempt to share his experiences with the world was born out of the desire to
radically restructure the all-too-human world in ways that open up space for bears, foxes, and
other animals to flourish beyond the oppressive and punitive hand of the dominant culture. For
Treadwell the success of his life’s work would generate new opportunities for other animals to
engage in unpredictable new socii alongside and independent of humans.
Radical Singularity, Unpredictability, and Inexhaustibility
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Calarco also draws attention to how Hutto’s ethological practice deepened his
appreciation of the irreducible singularity of mule deer personalities. Despite having spent seven
years living in close proximity to these animals, “Hutto concedes that he is ultimately unable to
discern some kind of essential, abstract deer personality.” 130 By spending time with individual
mule deer, Hutto learned to become attentive to the differences that existed between them and
came to recognize that each one possessed a unique and rich personality that distinguished each
individual from other members of the pack. Like Hutto, Treadwell became deeply attentive to
individual bears and foxes of Katmai. This attentiveness helped ensure his safety while
simultaneously expressing his love and appreciation for individual animals. Throughout his
book, Treadwell constantly comments on the unique personality traits, tendencies, and
proclivities of individual animals.131 His attentiveness to various character traits disclosed the
degree of indistinction that exists across species lines with respect to personality qualities that we
tend to assume only humans (or perhaps only certain nonhuman animals) possess. For instance,
Treadwell noted that “fighting and playing styles differed dramatically from bear to bear,
depending on each bear’s personality” and he recognized that “all bears have their personal
distance at which they tolerate humans and other animals.” 132 Treadwell never made the mistake
of underestimating the individuality of bears and foxes, and always acknowledged the possibility
that they could surprise him.
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While Treadwell was deeply attentive to individual bears, he remained careful and wary
because he recognized their unpredictability. For instance, an unanticipated encounter emerged
between Treadwell and a bear he knew well named Warren after Timmy the Fox woke him up
and made him angry during mating season. Warren exhibited signs of aggression (i.e., he had
lowered his head and was holding his ears back), but Treadwell responded by averting his gaze
and exposing his neck to the bear while Timmy hid behind him. This encounter made him
appreciate the level of awareness he had to exercise given the unpredictability of two animals he
thought he knew quite well—in his words;
The encounter had a profound effect on me. Though I had known Warren for over five
years, I could have been killed. The lesson was clear: To live near mating grizzlies, I
would have to be wary and respectful at all times.133
While Warren was unpredictably aggressive on rare occasions, there was one bear in
particular that Treadwell found to be utterly unpredictable in a manner that made him feel deeply
unsafe whenever he could see him; a “dark male” with “manic and wary eyes” whom he named
“Demon.”134 According to Treadwell, some bear experts labeled him the “25 th Grizzly,” which
signified a bear “that tolerates no man or bear, one that will kill without bias.” 135 On more than
one occasion Treadwell believed that this animal was going to kill him. During their first
encounter, Demon began to stalk Treadwell from a distance. Treadwell “tried to decipher his
body language . . . but couldn’t see any outwardly aggressive signals.” While most bears display
obvious signs of aggression before charging, Demon, acted “nonchalant.” Demon’s
unpredictability left Treadwell “dumbfounded” and desperate; he responded to Demon’s
relentless encroachment by “lunging toward him kicking and screaming,” “ready to die
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fighting.”136 Unlike the other bears that Treadwell encountered, Demon was the only one who
stalked him from a distance and was one of a handful of bears that Treadwell desperately
avoided as much as he could. He commented on Demon’s “menacing, wicked” and “maniacal”
eyes and avoided meeting his gaze. Despite his distrust of Demon, however, Treadwell still
thanked him for sparing his life. Treadwell respected and loved Demon, while recognizing that
his unpredictability and aggressiveness made him an unlikely candidate for acceptance or social
bonding. Encounters with Demon and other unpredictable bears taught Treadwell two important
lessons; that 1) he should not “trust nonchalant behavior”, and that 2) “in the wilderness, you
can’t take anything for granted. You can be killed on your last day just as easily as on your first.
There’s no coasting in the wild.”137
While Treadwell was regularly surprised by bears who were unpredictably dangerous and
aggressive, he was also pleasantly surprised by bears and foxes regularly. For instance, after five
years of seeing Mr. Chocolate only in the portion of Katmai he called the Grizzly Sanctuary, the
large bear appeared in a portion of the Preserve twenty miles from the Sanctuary—a place where
Treadwell did not expect to see him. This brought great comfort to Treadwell because Mr.
Chocolate was a very tolerant bear with whom he had a strong relationship. Having him around
made Treadwell feel safe because the bear deterred young adolescent male bears who might
otherwise challenge him.138 Treadwell was also pleasantly surprised by the mercifulness and
tranquility exhibited toward him by individual bears. For example, in 1995 during a trip to the
Grizzly Maze, a bear woke him up by nearly climbing into his tent;
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With almost human dexterity, the bear pulled the front tent flap aside and peered in at me.
I screamed and scrambled for a can of bear mace. . . I finally located the spray and had
uncapped the can before I realized that this calm, curious bear meant no harm. Wild
animals can be unpredictable, but as my head cleared and my heart slowed, I sensed only
peaceful intentions from the bear. . . I recognized the visitor: It was Melissa, a bear I’d
met the previous season. Melissa’s doglike snout and sparkling brown eyes looked at me
in wonder.139
This story reveals Treadwell’s acknowledgment of the unpredictable wildness of these
animals, while also bringing light to the inquisitiveness and peacefulness of individual bears.
This encounter reveals the intense richness and excitement of Treadwell’s experiments with
these individual animals. After sharing a few minutes together, Treadwell considered himself
lucky for having the opportunity to spend time with “such a sweet, beautiful bear” and thanked
Melissa for her visit.
These encounters, and others like them, caused Treadwell to alter his practices,
behaviors, and beliefs, while encouraging him to attempt to—"however partially and
imperfectly”—view the world from the perspectives of other, individual animals. The
epistemological world-travelling that stemmed from these encounters subverted and challenged
the all-too-human belief that nonhuman animals are replaceable, predictable, and exhaustible. It
is important to recognize that some of Treadwell’s methodologies that are often considered to be
anthropomorphic—particularly his singing and naming practices—emerged from encounters
with particular animals and were intended to recognize their singularity.
Treadwell’s use of song emerged instinctively from him during initial encounters with
these animals. We might recall that during Treadwell’s second encounter with a bear, he
instinctively began singing to the animal and believed that the gesture exhibited good will. 140 He
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had not planned to sing to the animal; rather, the inclination emerged from him in an
unanticipatable fashion. The accidental emergence of this behavior became a crucial method of
deescalating potential conflicts and relaxing these animals. In Treadwell’s words, “I mastered a
way of interacting with them with body language that enables me to be in extremely close
contact with them. . . I discovered that singing soothes these bears.” 141 And while many may
interpret Treadwell’s tendency to sing to these animals as revealing a deep misunderstanding of
bears and their behaviors, this criticism seems to be subverted when we attend to how Treadwell
used song as both a survival tactic (i.e., as a method of deescalating and discouraging conflict
with other, unpredictable animals) and as a method of acknowledging the uniqueness and
singularity of individual bears. As Treadwell explains, “For each bear, I had a particular rhythm
tune, and tone of voice.”142 In light of these aspects of Treadwell’s decision to sing to animals, it
is inappropriate to dismiss this practice as anthropomorphic.
Like Hutto, Treadwell named animals based on unique aspects of their personalities,
appearances, or in recognition of an event. While some critics claim that his decision to name
bears “pet names” was anthropomorphic, these criticisms focus on the names themselves without
attending to the circumstances, encounters, and reasons behind particular names. 143 An
investigation of the events that produced some of the most controversial names (i.e., Mr.
Chocolate and Timmy the Fox), may reveal that these naming practices were not domineering or
anthropomorphic.
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Treadwell first met Mr. Chocolate during his first “official” expedition to Katmai. While
watching fifty or so bears graze, wrestle, and mate in an open field, Treadwell stumbled upon a
craterous bear daybed where he fell asleep. He awoke to a huge, “deep chocolate brown” bear
grazing inches from his face. In this moment Treadwell was struck by the animal’s sublime
power; “I was terrified, yet I couldn’t help but marvel at the magnificent animal.” 144 Even though
the animal was physically powerful and could have easily dispatched Treadwell in that moment,
he was neither territorial, nor outwardly aggressive. Treadwell recognized, however, that “at that
moment, [his] future rested in his paws.” 145
Rather than allowing his fear to take over, Treadwell responded to the presence of the
creature by gently singing and apologizing for his encroachment; “. . . I sensed something unique
about this bear. I began to sing, ever so softly, ‘Mr. Chocolate Bear, I’m sorry I’m in your way.’”
Rather, than reflecting a childish or fanciful denial of the bear’s uniqueness, the name “Mr.
Chocolate Bear” emerged from Treadwell during an emergency as he desperately attempted to
convey good will to an animal he had unintentionally intruded upon. It is also worth mentioning
that this name reflects Treadwell’s attempt to show respect for the bear (by calling him “Mr.”),
while simultaneously acknowledging the uniqueness of the bear by attending to his rich brown
coat. The name also seemed to stick because it accurately signaled and honored the bear’s
friendly and gentle disposition, given the honorific connotations built into the title, “Mr.” 146
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People also condemn Treadwell for naming Timmy the Fox after himself. However, if we
recall the circumstances under which Treadwell named Timmy, a more charitable reading of this
decision might emerge.
The pups obeyed and kept their distance except for one particularly ornery sibling who
sneaked closer and closer to me. . . Much to his parents’ dismay, he became more brazen
with each visit. . . The more I got to know the little bugger, the more I realized that the
disobedient flaming torpedo of terror was a lot like me. One day, after he’d left the
relative safety of the fox family’s domain to follow me, I had no doubt what to name him.
I called him Timmy the Fox.147
Rather than conceiving of this name as an egocentric and anthropomorphic attempt to
deny the difference of the fox, we might instead recognize that this name emerged from
Treadwell’s recognition of the spirit that he and Timmy seemed to share. This name also served
to remind Treadwell of the initial encounter with the animal that was made possible by the
brazenness and boldness that characterized both of their personalities. It is also significant that
Treadwell did not go by Timmy. As such, within this name we might detect acknowledgment of
both this animal’s independence and singularity as well as a sort of kinship or family
resemblance.
While any naming practice can be understood as an act of violence that runs the risk of
pinning down or attempting to exhaust the singularity of an “Other,” it is important to recognize
the violence that stems from refusing to name animals as well. That is, when one refuses to name
an animal out of respect for their singularity, one risks homogenizing a population of animals by
failing to attend to each individual’s uniqueness. In view of how much attention Treadwell paid
to individual animals and his admission that he could never eliminate their uniqueness and
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irreducible difference, it seems inappropriate to write off his naming practices as
anthropomorphic denials of their inexhaustibility. 148
Loving Perception and World-Travelling
Treadwell’s comments regarding the failure of the National Park Service (which for him
emblematized the restriction, hegemony, and managerial perspective of the dominant order and
culture) to “watch” and “care” about these animals, illuminate the connection that Treadwell
makes between attentiveness and genuine concern;
They do not watch these animals. They don't care about these animals. All they wanna do
is screw people like me around. It's amazing. "Let the fishermen fucking shoot the
animals. Let the fucking poachers come in here and fuck 'em. Let the fucking commercial
people fuck them around with their fucking cameras and the tourists. But we're gonna go
screw with Timothy Treadwell because he loves animals and teaches kids for free. Let's
go. Let's do that. That's what we're gonna do."149
A crucial aspect of his care and concern for other animals was intimately tied to
appreciating them and coming to know them as individuals. The failure (or inability) of most
tourists to closely attend to animals and their plights was deeply troubling to him. Many critics of
Treadwell dismiss this “rant” as egomaniacal, insane, or exaggerated, without recognizing the
validity of his concerns. For instance, Lapinski is extremely dismissive of Treadwell’s distaste
for tourists and criticizes his tendency to run away, hide, or “act like a bear” (by growling or
behaving as a bear does when they are agitated) when he was confronted by tour guides and
camera-bearing tourists.150 He would also sometimes scare the bears away, so tourists could not
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take pictures of them, which irritated many bear tour guides. While it is tempting to accuse
Treadwell of hypocrisy or claim that he was possessive of the bears, there is a richer, and more
charitable account of why Treadwell responded to tourists in this manner.
Rather than claiming he was delusional, hypocritical, possessive, or out of touch, we
might instead recognize that these acts served to prevent tourists from using the animals he loved
in ways he deemed disrespectful. We might illustrate this point with Maria Lugones’ distinction
between loving perception and arrogant perception.151 For Lugones, loving perception involves
the expression of sensitivity and good-will when encountering others and their worlds—it
involves a humble attempt to see the world from another’s perspective. Arrogant perception,
however, is characterized by a failure to deeply attend to others and their worlds. Arrogant
perception often involves a dismissal of the value of other perspectives or an attempt to reduce or
essentialize the worlds of others in uncharitable or impoverishing fashions. Lugones describes
world-travelling as a method of putting epistemological pluralism into practice in such a way that
one might lovingly attend to others and attempt to see the world from their perspectives. While
Lugones focused on human world-travelling, these concepts are apt for understanding
interspecies world-travelling as well.
Treadwell’s ethological project was lovingly perceptive in this sense; he respected and
valued the worlds of these other animals and conceived of himself as a respectful visitor. From
Treadwell’s perspective tourists and park officials exhibited arrogant perception toward both him
and the bears. Rather than sympathetically engaging with him and the bears in ways that showed
respect and understanding, from Treadwell’s perspective these people were participating in an
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unacceptable form of conceptual violence that failed to attend to Treadwell and the bears as
individuals with unique and meaningful worlds. The failure of these individuals to embrace
loving epistemic pluralism, stemmed directly from their non-loving and inattentive attitudes.
Treadwell scorned people who failed to world-travel in respectful and loving fashions and
denounced practices that treated the animals he loved as objects for their consumption.
Like Hutto, however, Treadwell’s world-travelling exposed him not only to great joys,
but also to great pains. As Calarco points out, Hutto’s life among mule deer inevitably exposed
him to irreconcilable paradoxes that were quite painful for him. For instance, we might recall
Hutto’s inability to think about the hunting of mule deer from a detached position after
immersing himself in the pack and developing emotional bonds with individual animals. In
addition to the paradoxes that Treadwell underwent with respect to how he should respond to the
plights of other animals, Treadwell also believed that the influence of his project would be
magnified by the drama of his death. His ethical commitment and deep love for these animals
created a paradoxical tension within him. On the one hand, he wanted to live with these animals
and continue his work, but on the other, he felt that his death would draw more public attention
to the issues facing the animals he loved. Treadwell’s struggle with this paradox is illuminated
by a letter he wrote to his friend and ecologist, Marnie Gaede. In Grizzly Man, Gaede reads the
letter aloud and comments on it thusly;
‘There are many times that I feel death is the best option. My work would be much more
seriously looked at and possibly make the difference that in living, I can't do.’ I think that
was sort of a paradox for him. That he felt not worthy enough to get his message across at
times. And so, maybe, in the drama of death his message would be more poignant and
reach out to more people.
This letter and Gaede’s response reveal Treadwell’s bottomless love for these animals as
well as the force of the transformations inspired by his encounters and relationships with
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individual bears and foxes. His ontological pluralism and the mental transformations he
underwent during his time with these animals combined in such a way that he embraced the
possibility of his death if it would stimulate the systemic and cultural transformations needed to
generate more just relationships with these animals. 152 The sacrificial beauty of this gesture
cannot be understated. Treadwell’s ability to simultaneously see himself as an individual subject,
an ecological participant, and a narrative force allowed him to escape the egoism that traps many
people and allowed him to deeply consider how he might use his body to generate the kind of
change that humans and other animals desperately need. Treadwell’s ability to see himself from
these multiple lenses is worth pausing over. As individuals and as a culture, we have much to
learn from him.
Calarco points out that sometimes these ethological paradoxes lead to psychological
anguish that render it extremely difficult for one to continue living intimately with vulnerable
animals.153 The regular grief Hutto felt upon witnessing the suffering of the deer whom he loved
combined with a recognition of the existential plight facing the species as a whole, led to his
decision to cease living in their midst; “For his own psychological integrity, then, he felt the need
to remove himself from the daily life of the deer.” 154 His advocacy did not stop after leaving the
pack, however, as he continues to share his stories and spread awareness regarding the
challenges that these animals face.
While we must respect Hutto’s decision to leave the mule deer after spending seven years
of his life with them, it is important that we do not condemn those whose love for other animals
152
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consumes them, both figuratively and literally. It is important to acknowledge the power, beauty,
and (sometimes) irony of those who are annihilated by their love for another. 155 A reader familiar
with the biographical details of Friedrich Nietzsche might recall that he lapsed into madness and
never spoke another word upon seeing an exhausted horse being beaten in Turin, Italy. Rather
than dismissing the power of this story (even if it is anecdotal), we must recognize the
transformative power of such an encounter and come to understand that anyone can be consumed
by love for another and that there is beauty in such consumption. Despite the pain that stemmed
from his life among bears and foxes, Treadwell never allowed this pain to deter him from his
project. This decision eventually resulted in his consumption—a possibility he recognized and
embraced.156
According to Nietzsche there is wisdom in pain and the people who are able to embrace
pain and affirm life in view of it should be recognized as heroic; he refers to these individuals as
“great pain bringers.”157 Monika Langer elaborates on Nietzsche’s pain bringers, thusly;
Nietzsche acknowledges some heroic individuals rejoice and increase their energies when
confronting impending danger and pain. Nietzsche calls them humanity’s “great pain
bringers.” He says they contribute enormously to preserving and furthering our species –
even if only by resisting and scorning comfortableness. Nietzsche’s calling these “great
pain bringers” heroic species’ furtherers may alarm readers. However, it is important to
realize these people do not cause or create the impending danger. They only respond
differently, by proudly defying it. . . Nietzsche also said humanity’s “great pain bringers”
oppose and scorn comfortableness. All this indicates these are not tyrants or torturers.
Rather, they challenge complacency by scorn and example.158
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Treadwell challenged the complacency of his culture through scorn and by lived example;
as such, we might understand him as a pain bringer who refused to allow a fear of exposure,
discomfort, or pain to dissuade him from living out his vision of the good life without reservation.
He rejected the trivial comforts and complacency of the dominant culture and refused to insulate
himself from the agony of other animals or the anguish of recognizing his own edibility. It was his
hope that through embracing the discomfort and pain of an exposed life, new vistas, joys, and
possibilities would present themselves to him—and they did.
Treadwell died as consequence of his dedication to his principled decision to live a life of
exposure and to suspend himself in vulnerability. Treadwell accepted that his death was an
inevitability and refused to let his finitude or fear of being consumed inhibit him from living
dangerously. He recognized that pain and danger were unavoidable aspects of his experimental
ethological project and learned to embrace discomfort and risk in view of the riches they made
possible. Nietzsche captures this sentiment beautifully;
For believe me: the secret for harvesting from existence the greatest fruitfulness and the
greatest enjoyment is-to live dangerously! Build your cities on the slopes of Vesuvius!
Send your ships into uncharted seas! Live at war with your peers and yourselves! Be
robbers and conquerors as long as you cannot be rulers and possessors, you seekers of
knowledge! Soon the age will be past when you could be content to live hidden in forests
like shy deer. At long last the search for knowledge will reach out for its due; it will want
to rule and possess, and you with it!159
The fruits of Treadwell’s pain-bringing and affirmation in the face of danger are perhaps
most evident in his response to a radio broadcast detailing the end of a two-week storm that
delayed the arrival of his supplies. As the long storm carried on, Treadwell worried that he might
starve because the weather had delayed the arrival of much needed supplies. In response to his
pessimism, Treadwell told himself, “Get a grip, Timothy! . . . This is just the rainy-day, cabin159
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fever blues. It’s nothing a bit of sunshine can’t cure.” 160 Not long after, Treadwell heard the news
that the storm was coming to an end and enjoyed a surprise visit from his friend and pilot, Bill,
who arrived with fresh supplies and relieved his anxieties regarding the possibility of starvation.
In response to these developments, Treadwell was filled with immense joy and decided to dance
in the light of a new day.
Kicking off my soggy shoes, I danced around in my bare feet. Twenty-seven bears
grazed, dozed, and played around me. I moved among them at will, feeling like a bear
myself. Wet, brown earth oozed and squirted between my toes. 161
There is a deep resonance between Treadwell’s words and those of Nietzsche;
Are we not surrounded by bright morning? And by soft green grass and grounds, the
kingdom of the dance? Has there ever been a better hour for gaiety? Who will sing a song
for us, a morning song, so sunny. so light. so fledged that it will not chase away the blues
but invite them instead to join in the singing and dancing? 162
There is no doubt that Treadwell knew how to sing and dance. With his every breath he
invited us to sing and dance alongside him.
VI. In Favor of Exposed Ethological Experiments
The bears and foxes with whom Treadwell interacted should not be understood as having
lost their “wildness;” nor should they be thought of as becoming domesticated by Treadwell.
Rather, the set of relationships and assemblages that developed and unfolded over Treadwell’s
thirteen summers changed all parties and animal individuals with whom he interacted. These
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shared becomings might be understood as instances of wild familiarity. Val Plumwood uses the
term “wild familiar” to capture the character of her relationship with a wombat named Birubi. 163
After nursing the injured wombat back to health when he was young, Plumwood spent twelve
years of her life negotiating space, sharing food, and being astonished by the “mysterious”
animal; “Birubi was a ‘wild familiar’ who established his own terms for contact and
friendship.”164 Plumwood repeatedly emphasizes that even though Birubi spent time with her and
regularly shared her domicile, he never lost his “wombatness.” He continued to pursue his own
interests and act out his desires while being free to come and go as he pleased. Similarly, the
bears and foxes with whom Treadwell spent his time were neither dominated or coerced by
Treadwell and never lost their independence, wildness, or singularity—they retained their
bearness and foxness respectively. As such, it seems inaccurate to claim that Treadwell’s project
was an act of domestication.165 We might, however, accurately describe his project as one that
habituated or familiarized these animals to a human. 166 It is important that we do not conflate
domestication and habituation (or familiarization). While Treadwell’s did familiarize these
animals to his presence, he did not make bears and foxes dependent upon him, nor did he shape
163
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them according to his will. Some critics of Treadwell are resistant to co-exposed projects
grounded in wild-familiarity and interactive negotiability because they worry that familiarization
might encourage members of nonhuman species to be more likely to trust humans who intend to
do them harm. Others renounce projects like Treadwell’s because they are concerned that
familiarization may encourage conflicts that result in the deaths of nonhuman animals. These
worries, however, indicate a need to interrogate the fear-driven and violent practices that are
encouraged, allowed, and facilitated by the dominant culture. This theme is explored in the
following section. Similarly, if these critics are concerned for the safety of humans who might
not know how to relate to other animals (especially other predators) in ways that do not generate
conflict, then we should attend to this lack of knowledge, rather than condemning projects that
aim to live with animals on their terms. Arguments against familiarization, then, point toward
socio-cultural and political issues, not shortcomings of Treadwell’s project itself. It is important
that we embrace projects of this kind, because such projects provide important insight into how
space might be negotiated and how conflicts might be deescalated.
Moreover, if we are reluctant to encourage ethological projects like Treadwell’s or if we
refuse to live near other animals out of fear that they will become habituated, then we must
interrogate why exactly we fear or condemn habituation. If we do not want animals to become
familiar with humans out of concern for the welfare of these animals, then that should point to
the need to restructure our urban centers, our modes of production and transportation, as well as
our behavioral and cultural practices. Given the vulnerability of many predator species (in the
United States and abroad) exposed ethological projects like Treadwell’s are needed if predator
populations are to remain viable in years to come. As I hope to have shown, these sorts of
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projects play four important roles that should inform the cultural and behavior practices of nonethologists.
First, these projects serve to disrupt and challenge notions of human exceptionalism,
which is critically important for getting to the root of many anthropogenic ecological issues that
threaten nonhuman animals and the rest of the more-than-human world. Second, exposed
ethological projects disclose the incredible social plasticity of other animals. Treadwell’s project
allowed many people to appreciate the impressive social plasticity of supposedly inflexible social
dynamics of relatively solitary predatory animals like brown bears and red foxes. Long-term
projects are especially revelatory because they tend to disclose deeper forms of intergenerational
change, as young animals grow up without predisposed fear of humans. These disclosures are
invaluable when it comes to overcoming ignorance and misunderstandings of other animals.
Third, exposed ethological projects encourage us to embrace epistemological, ontological, and
ethical pluralism while revealing how we might negotiate conflicts emerging from competing
ethical sensibilities. While there will always be ambiguity and tension in our decision-making
processes, ethological projects of this sort provide indications of how we might resolve these
conflicts. And fourth, by disrupting human exceptionalism and revealing different interspecies
social possibilities, these projects open up space for thinking about how we might make various
forms of cohabitation safer, more viable, and less likely to result in interspecies conflict and
violence. Treadwell’s work provides us with a rich and intimate knowledge of brown bear and
red fox behavior. His footage and stories also provide examples of how to handle and respond to
fear (through expressing goodwill), aggression (by standing one’s ground and negotiating space),
and distrust (by spending time with these animals and developing social bonds). This information
is extremely valuable to those who are likely to interact with predatory species because of where
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they live.167 Treadwell himself emphasized the ways his project was beneficial for both “animals
and people alike.”168 In his words;
For the animals, my presence offers a shield of protection from human displacement and
poaching. For people, my studies will help in understanding the natural ways of the bears
and will make a contribution toward their preservation. 169
Ethological experiments with predators, also help humans come to terms with their
vulnerability in ways that might encourage humans to sacrifice some of their control and safety
in an effort to create space for other animals to flourish.170
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, I made a case for how Timothy Treadwell’s project, while problematic in
certain respects, ought to be understood as a form of exposed ethological experimentation
compatible with Calarco’s ethological framework. I have suggested that Treadwell’s ethological
project led to social, environmental, and mental transformations that illuminated and generated
unprecedented interspecies social dynamics and assemblages while providing Treadwell with
deep insight into the worlds of two prominent predator species. These aspects of Treadwell’s life
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among predators are especially enlightening because coastal brown bears and red foxes tend to
be thought of as solitary and nonsocial animals.
Treadwell’s ethological practice and the subsequent transformations, dehabituations, and
resubjectifications he underwent, expose us to new perspectives and help us reimage possibilities
for relationships between humans and other predators. Treadwell’s ability to embrace the
paradoxes that emerged from it inspire us to not allow the pain of contradiction to impede our
efforts to generate new ways of life and to work passionately to change world in view of the
plights of animals.
Treadwell’s eventual death at the jaws and paws of a bear should not overshadow the
power and efficacy of his methods and the possibilities that they revealed and actualized. 171
Treadwell’s ontological, ethical, and epistemological pluralisms in conjunction with his
willingness to dwell in the nepantlic and spandrelic thresholds between social and subjective
worlds reflect his ability and desire to embrace the murkiness and pain of world-travelling.
Treadwell was a nepantlera and a “great pain bringer.” He embraced the possibility of his
edibility, and lived a life characterized by fine risk that flirted with the borderlands between life
and death, between his subjectivity and “the outside.” 172 He sang and danced alongside the
animals he loved in the face of this danger—we should admire the beauty of such an existence.
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Plumwood, 1996, p. 35.
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